G.R. No. 241986 , August 22, 2022
Feliciano Palad Legaspi, Sr., Petitioner vs. People of the Philippines, Respondent.

FACTS

Petitioner Feliciano Palad Legaspi, Sr., the elected Municipal Mayor of Norzagaray, Bulacan, was administratively suspended for six months and one day by the Office of the Ombudsman for oppression. The Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG) Regional Office issued the suspension order on December 12, 2012. DILG officers attempted personal service on Legaspi at the municipal hall but could not find him. They contacted him via phone through the Municipal Human Resource Management Officer (MHRMO), Silangan Rivas. After initial refusal, Legaspi instructed Rivas to receive the order on his behalf, which she did. The following day, Rivas sent a letter seeking to return the order, claiming she was not authorized to receive it. The DILG rejected this, noting Legaspi’s counsel later acknowledged in a pleading that the mayor had “received” the memorandum. Vice Mayor Rogelio Santos, Jr. was sworn in as acting mayor.
Despite the suspension, from December 2012 to June 2013, Legaspi solemnized 37 marriages and issued a mayor’s permit. Consequently, he was charged with 38 counts of usurpation of official functions under Article 177 of the Revised Penal Code. The Sandiganbayan convicted him, ruling that the suspension order was validly served and thus effective, making his subsequent acts of performing mayoral functions unlawful.

ISSUE

The core issue is whether the Sandiganbayan erred in convicting Legaspi of usurpation of official functions by ruling that the suspension order was validly served upon him, thereby rendering his performance of official duties during the suspension period unlawful.

RULING

The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction. The Court meticulously applied the rules on service of court orders and processes by analogy to the service of the administrative suspension order by the DILG. It found that substituted service was properly effected under the circumstances. Personal service was initially attempted at Legaspi’s office but he was not found. The DILG officers then communicated with him by phone through a responsible person at his office, the MHRMO. Legaspi himself directed the MHRMO to receive the documents. This constituted a valid substituted service, as the service was made on a person of sufficient discretion (the MHRMO) at the defendant’s office, with his explicit instruction.
The Court rejected Legaspi’s argument that the subsequent letter from the MHRMO disclaiming authority invalidated the service. The act of service was complete upon her receipt at Legaspi’s directive. His counsel’s subsequent judicial pleading, which stated that “respondent Mayor Legaspi received the Memorandum,” constituted a judicial admission that bound him and confirmed the validity and completion of service. Therefore, the suspension order was effective from December 12, 2012. Any official acts performed by Legaspi as mayor after this date, including the solemnization of marriages, were undertaken without lawful authority. All elements of usurpation of official functions under Article 177 were thus present: he performed acts pertaining to the office of mayor under pretense of official position while under a valid suspension order.