G.R. No. L-24134. July 21, 1977.
THE BRADMAN COMPANY, INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and MANILA BAY WATCHMEN ASSOCIATION, respondents.

FACTS

The Manila Bay Watchmen Association, certified as the sole bargaining agent for watchmen on petitioner’s vessels, sent collective bargaining proposals to The Bradman Company, Inc. on May 7, 1960. The company’s shipping manager, Florendo M. Padilla, admitted under oath that he did not make any written reply to these demands, acting upon the recommendation of the company president. Following its official certification in November 1960, the union reiterated its demands by letter on December 29, 1960, warning of protective measures if no action was taken. The company again disregarded this request, with Padilla testifying, “These demands being made by the Manila Bay Watchmen Association, we disregarded the request and demands.”
Subsequently, on January 2, 1961, fifty-nine union members reported for work on the vessel “Eurymedon” but were prevented from boarding by the company manager, Mr. Manzano. He informed them they had been replaced by another agency because “You have a case in Court.” The respondent Court of Industrial Relations found that this testimony was never refuted by the company. The court concluded the workers’ discharge was due to their union affiliation and activities, including their request for recognition and the filing of a case.

ISSUE

Whether the Court of Industrial Relations correctly found petitioner guilty of unfair labor practice for refusal to bargain collectively and for the discriminatory dismissal of employees.

RULING

Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Industrial Relations. The legal logic rests on the statutory duty to bargain collectively in good faith under the Industrial Peace Act ( Republic Act No. 875 ). The duty to bargain means the mutual obligation to meet, confer promptly, and negotiate in good faith, though it does not compel agreement. The petitioner’s outright refusal to even reply to the certified union’s repeated bargaining proposals constituted a clear and evident refusal to bargain, an unfair labor practice.
Regarding the dismissal, the Court upheld the factual findings of the industrial court. It is a settled doctrine that such findings are conclusive when supported by substantial evidence. Here, the unrefuted testimony established that the workers were barred from work specifically due to their union case, making the dismissal discriminatory and an unfair labor practice. The petitioner’s constitutional arguments on equal protection and impairment of contracts were unavailing. The Court emphasized that these general constitutional guarantees must be reconciled with, and yield to, the specific constitutional mandates of social justice and protection to labor, which govern labor controversies. The state’s power to regulate labor relations for the common good justifies the imposed obligations on the employer.