G.R. No. L-24000 November 29, 1971
Eugenio De La Cruz and Manuel Monsalud, petitioners, vs. Hon. Court of Appeals and Luis Aguilar, respondents.

FACTS

The case involves a dispute within the Forest Products Research Institute. Petitioner Eugenio de la Cruz was the Director, and respondent Luis Aguilar was the Assistant Director. Following an administrative complaint filed by two Institute employees against Director De la Cruz with the Presidential Committee on Administrative Performance Efficiency (PCAPE), De la Cruz, in his answer to the complaint, listed counter-charges against Aguilar. Based solely on these counter-charges made in his answer, and without a formal complaint being filed against Aguilar, Director De la Cruz issued an order on February 12, 1959, suspending Aguilar from office pending investigation. The suspension order was mailed and received by Aguilar on February 13. Subsequently, De la Cruz padlocked Aguilar’s office and issued a memorandum barring him from the premises, designating Manuel Monsalud as Acting Assistant Director.
Aguilar filed a petition for prohibition and quo warranto with the Court of First Instance of Laguna, challenging the legality of his suspension and his exclusion from office. The trial court ruled in favor of Aguilar, declaring the suspension illegal and ordering his reinstatement. The court also awarded Aguilar P1,000.00 as attorney’s fees. The Court of Appeals affirmed this decision in its entirety. Petitioners De la Cruz and Monsalud appealed to the Supreme Court, contesting specifically the award of attorney’s fees.

ISSUE

The sole issue for resolution is whether the award of P1,000.00 as attorney’s fees to respondent Luis Aguilar was proper.

RULING

The Supreme Court affirmed the award of attorney’s fees. The legal logic proceeds from the established finding that Director De la Cruz’s act of suspending Assistant Director Aguilar was illegal. The Court sustained the lower courts’ conclusion that De la Cruz lacked the authority to order a preventive suspension under the circumstances. The suspension was based on charges De la Cruz himself raised in an answer to a complaint filed by others, not on a formal administrative case where Aguilar was the respondent. Furthermore, the Court of Appeals found no valid justification for a preventive suspension, as there was no showing that Aguilar could hamper the investigation.
Given the illegality of the suspension, which compelled Aguilar to engage legal counsel to vindicate his rights and regain his office, the award of attorney’s fees was deemed just and equitable under Article 2208(11) of the Civil Code. This provision allows recovery of attorney’s fees in any case where the court deems it just and equitable. The Supreme Court held that the lower courts correctly exercised their discretion, as Aguilar was forced into litigation to protect his lawful employment from an arbitrary administrative act. The decision of the Court of Appeals was therefore affirmed.