G.R. No. 239215 , July 12, 2022
Randy Michael Knutson, Acting on Behalf of Minor Rhuby Sibal Knutson, Petitioner, vs. Hon. Elisa R. Sarmiento-Flores, in her capacity as Acting Presiding Judge of Branch 69, Regional Trial Court, Taguig City, and Rosalina Sibal Knutson, Respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Randy Michael Knutson filed a petition for a protection order under Republic Act No. 9262 , the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004, on behalf of his minor daughter, Rhuby. He alleged that the child’s mother, respondent Rosalina Sibal Knutson, had committed acts of violence and abuse against their child. The case presents the novel legal question of whether a mother can be considered an offender under RA 9262 for acts of violence committed against her own child.
The Regional Trial Court dismissed the petition. It ruled that RA 9262 was designed to protect women and children from violence perpetrated by the woman’s intimate partner, not to prosecute a mother for violence against her child. The petitioner elevated the case, arguing that the law’s protective mechanisms should extend to a child abused by a mother, and that as a parent, he has standing to file the petition on his child’s behalf.

ISSUE

The principal issue is whether a father can validly apply for a protection order under RA 9262 against the mother of his child, based on allegations that the mother committed violence against their common child.

RULING

The Supreme Court, through the ponencia, ruled in the affirmative, holding that a father has standing to file a petition for protection and custody orders under RA 9262 against a mother alleged to have abused their child. The Court interpreted Section 9(b) of the law, which allows “parents or guardians of the offended party” to file a petition, as granting the father such standing. The ponencia concluded that the law’s protective scope extends to the child independently, and a petition can be filed against any perpetrator, including the mother.
However, in a dissenting opinion, Justice Zalameda disagreed with this interpretation. He argued that a textual and contextual analysis of RA 9262 reveals it was not intended to cover violence committed by a mother against her own child. The law’s title and definitional section consistently link the protected “children” to a “woman victim of violence.” The offender is statutorily defined as a person who has or had an intimate relationship with the woman (e.g., husband, former partner, father of her child). The law’s structure presupposes the victim is either the woman or her child, and the perpetrator is the woman’s intimate partner. Congressional records confirm the law was enacted to address gender-based violence in intimate relationships, with children as incidental beneficiaries. Therefore, while a father has standing under Section 9(b), it is to file against a third-party offender (e.g., the mother’s new partner who harms the child), not against the mother herself. Justice Zalameda proposed that the proper remedy for the father in this scenario is to seek custody and protection under A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC (The Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors), and thus a remand of the case for this purpose was proper.