G.R. No. 239168 , September 15, 2020
Alfredo J. Non, et al., Petitioners, vs. Office of the Ombudsman and Alyansa Para Sa Bagong Pilipinas, Inc., Respondents.

FACTS

Petitioners, Commissioners of the Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC), issued Resolution No. 1, Series of 2016, which suspended the effectivity of the Competitive Selection Process (CSP) requirement for Power Supply Agreements (PSAs) from November 7, 2015, to April 30, 2016. This action followed numerous letters from various industry stakeholders, including distribution utilities and generation companies, raising issues regarding the CSP guidelines’ constitutionality, implementation, and applicability. The Office of the Ombudsman found probable cause to charge petitioners with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019, alleging they acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence to accommodate PSAs, particularly those of MERALCO, which filed seven agreements without CSP just before the extended deadline.

ISSUE

Whether the Office of the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in finding probable cause to charge petitioners with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019.

RULING

Yes. The Ombudsman’s finding of probable cause was tainted with grave abuse of discretion. Probable cause requires sufficient facts to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the accused is probably guilty, necessitating that all elements of the charged crime be present in reasonable likelihood. For a violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019, an essential element is the presence of manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or inexcusable negligence. The Ombudsman’s determination rested on a sweeping supposition that the mere act of suspending the CSP implementation, by itself, demonstrated these culpable mental states to accommodate specific companies. However, the resolution and records reveal no concrete evidence to buttress this claim of partiality, bad faith, or gross negligence. Instead, the evidence shows the suspension was a transitional measure to address legitimate concerns from multiple stakeholders about implementing the new CSP guidelines, as expressly stated in the resolution’s whereas clauses. The Ombudsman’s conclusion was thus arbitrary, as it equated the administrative act of suspension—which was subsequently declared void in a separate civil case for grave abuse of discretion—with automatic criminal liability without establishing the required mental element. The purposes and legal parameters for reviewing an administrative issuance and for determining criminal probable cause are distinct. Consequently, the petition is granted.