GR 239168 Lazaro Javier (Digest)
G.R. No. 239168 , September 15, 2020
Alfredo J. Non, et al., Petitioners, vs. Office of the Ombudsman and Alyansa Para Sa Bagong Pilipinas, Inc., Respondents.
FACTS
The Office of the Ombudsman (OMB) found probable cause to charge the petitioners, then members of the Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC), with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019. The charge stemmed from ERC Resolution No. 1, series of 2016, which postponed the effectivity of the mandatory Competitive Selection Process (CSP) for Power Supply Agreements (PSAs) from November 7, 2015, to April 30, 2016. This extension allowed Manila Electric Company (MERALCO) to file seven PSAs without undergoing CSP just before the new deadline. The OMB concluded this act gave unwarranted benefits to MERALCO and other distribution utilities, circumventing a policy designed to secure the best terms for consumers.
The petitioners argued the resolution was intended to provide a reasonable transition period for industry compliance, responding to inquiries from various stakeholders, not just MERALCO. They emphasized that in a prior related case ( G.R. No. 227670 ), the Supreme Court nullified Resolution No. 1 solely because the ERC lacked the power to modify the CSP effectivity date set by the Department of Energy, and not due to any finding of corrupt motive or “shenanigans” in its issuance.
ISSUE
Did the Office of the Ombudsman commit grave abuse of discretion in finding probable cause to indict the petitioners for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019?
RULING
Yes, the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion. The standard for reviewing a prosecutor’s finding of probable cause is reasonableness, not correctness. A determination is reasonable if it is justified, transparent, intelligible, and falls within a range of acceptable outcomes defensible in law and fact. The OMB’s analysis was unreasonable as it relied on an incomplete premise: that because MERALCO benefited from the deadline extension, the petitioners’ sole and criminal intent was to confer an unwarranted advantage.
This interpretation ignores the complex factual context, including industry-wide requests for clarification and a transition period, which the OMB did not adequately weigh. As noted in prior judicial deliberations, the reasonableness of the extension and its impact are factual matters demanding evidence, not suited for summary probable cause determination based on speculation. The OMB’s logic, if accepted, would perilously expand liability under R.A. 3019 to cover routine policy decisions where one party incidentally benefits. Consequently, the OMB’s action falls outside the range of acceptable, rational outcomes. The petition is granted, and the criminal information is ordered dismissed for lack of probable cause.
