G.R. No. L-23634. July 29, 1976.
GAMBOA’S INCORPORATED, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE HONORABLE NICASIO YATCO, THE HONORABLE DAMIAN JIMENEZ, THE PROGRESSIVE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, MR. FRANCISCO M. VILLANUEVA AND THE CITY SHERIFF OF QUEZON CITY, PHILIPPINES, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Gamboa’s Incorporated was a lessee of offices owned by respondent Progressive Development Corporation. Due to unpaid rentals, Progressive filed an ejectment case. The parties entered into a stipulation, which was adopted as the judgment of the City Court on April 25, 1962. The judgment ordered Gamboa to pay a monthly installment of P1,700.00, with half applied to current rent and half to arrears, until the back rentals were fully settled. It stipulated that failure to pay one installment would result in immediate execution upon motion. Gamboa initially defaulted, and a writ of execution for ejectment was issued but not enforced. Gamboa subsequently made installment payments, and by November 20, 1963, its counsel acknowledged that the back rentals under the 1962 judgment had been fully paid.
Despite this payment, Progressive sold the property to respondent Francisco Villanueva on December 5, 1963. On December 12, 1963, Progressive applied for and obtained an alias writ of execution from the City Court. This writ directed the sheriff to eject Gamboa and to levy on its personal properties to satisfy the amount of P7,740.00, representing the very same unpaid rentals adjudged in 1962. The sheriff executed the writ, ousting Gamboa on January 10, 1964. Gamboa filed petitions for certiorari in the Court of First Instance and later the Court of Appeals, both of which were dismissed, leading to this appeal.

ISSUE

The primary issue is whether the alias writ of execution issued on December 12, 1963, was valid despite the petitioner’s claim of full satisfaction of the monetary obligation under the 1962 judgment.

RULING

The Supreme Court ruled that the alias writ of execution was a nullity insofar as it commanded the levy on petitioner’s properties to collect P7,740.00. The legal principle is that a writ of execution must conform strictly to the judgment it seeks to enforce; if it differs from or exceeds the judgment, it is void. The 1962 judgment provided for execution only upon failure to pay an installment. The factual finding, which the Court accepted, was that the specific monetary obligation for back rentals under that judgment had been fully paid by November 1963. Consequently, there was no longer a subsisting monetary obligation under that judgment to execute. The alias writ, by ordering a levy for that already-settled sum, effectively altered and exceeded the terms of the final judgment, rendering it invalid for that purpose.
However, the Court upheld the ejectment aspect of the writ. It found that the lease was not impliedly renewed. While Gamboa remained in possession after the judgment, the lessor, Progressive, had served several notices to vacate. Under the law, an implied new lease requires that the lessee continues enjoying the property for more than fifteen days after the lease term without any contrary notice from the lessor. The service of notices to vacate expressly prevented any implied renewal. Therefore, Progressive had the right to eject Gamboa, and that part of the alias writ was valid. The Court clarified that any claim for unpaid rentals for periods after the 1962 judgment, or Gamboa’s claim for improvements, must be pursued in separate actions. The decision of the Court of Appeals was modified accordingly.