G.R. No. 235424 , February 03, 2021
Sally Sarmiento, Petitioner, vs. Edita A. Dizon, Represented by Her Attorney-in-Fact Roberto Talaue, Respondent.

FACTS

Respondent Edita A. Dizon, through her attorney-in-fact Roberto Talaue, filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against petitioner Sally Sarmiento before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC). Dizon alleged she is the registered owner of a parcel of land covered by TCT No. RT-79553 (249562) located at Lot 25, Block 4, Pasong Tamo, Sunny Ville Subdivision, Quezon City. She claimed that sometime in 1989, Sarmiento requested permission from Dizon’s father, Paquito Ang, to temporarily stay on the property, which was granted out of mercy. After Ang’s death in 1993, Dizon requested Sarmiento to vacate. A formal demand letter was sent on January 6, 1999, but Sarmiento refused to leave. Sarmiento, in her answer, denied possessing the property by mere tolerance, claimed she had been in actual possession since 1979, and asserted that the property she occupied was different from Dizon’s lot. The MeTC ruled in favor of Dizon, ordering Sarmiento to vacate, pay monthly compensation, attorney’s fees, and costs. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) affirmed the MeTC decision. Sarmiento filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals (CA), which was denied due course and dismissed for being filed out of time and for lack of merit. Sarmiento’s motion for reconsideration was also denied for being filed out of time.

ISSUE

1. Whether the CA erred in affirming the decisions of the lower courts.
2. Whether the CA erred in failing to pass upon the arguments raised by Sarmiento for the first time on appeal.

RULING

The Supreme Court GRANTED the Petition. The Court held that while Sarmiento’s petition before the CA was filed out of time, the substantive merits of the case warranted a review. The Court found that Dizon failed to establish the jurisdictional facts required for an unlawful detainer action. Specifically, Dizon did not sufficiently prove that Sarmiento’s possession of the property was by mere tolerance or that Dizon had prior physical possession. The only evidence of tolerance was the testimony of Talaue, who had no personal knowledge of the alleged permission granted by Dizon’s father. Furthermore, Dizon’s Torrens title and tax receipts, while evidence of ownership, do not by themselves establish the fact of prior physical possession or tolerance necessary in an ejectment case. The Court also noted that Sarmiento’s claim of possession since 1979, if true, would negate the idea of possession by mere tolerance starting in 1989. Consequently, the proper remedy should have been an accion publiciana or a plenary action for recovery of possession, not a summary action for unlawful detainer. The decisions of the MeTC, RTC, and CA were reversed and set aside. The complaint for unlawful detainer was dismissed without prejudice to the filing of an appropriate action.