GR 232989; (March, 2019) (Digest)
G.R. No. 232989 . March 18, 2019
RUFINA S. JORGE, PETITIONER, VS. ALBERTO C. MARCELO, ET AL., AND THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (THIRD DIVISION), RESPONDENTS.
FACTS
Private respondents, former employees, filed labor complaints against R. Jorgensons Swine Multiplier Corporation and Romeo J. Jorge. The Labor Arbiter dismissed the illegal dismissal complaint but awarded separation pay, nominal damages, and attorney’s fees. A writ of execution was issued to satisfy the monetary award. The sheriff levied a property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-45328, registered solely in the name of petitioner Rufina S. Jorge, but described therein as “married to Romeo J. Jorge,” a losing party. Rufina, claiming to be the sole and absolute owner of the property and not a party to the case, filed a Third Party Claim with the NLRC to lift the levy. She argued the phrase “married to” is merely descriptive of civil status and does not confer co-ownership.
The NLRC denied the Third Party Claim, ruling it was the improper remedy. It held that a third-party claimant should instead file a separate reivindicatory action to assert ownership. The NLRC also noted Rufina failed to post the required supersedeas bond. The Court of Appeals affirmed the NLRC’s resolutions. Hence, Rufina filed this petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE
Whether the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying Rufina S. Jorge’s Third Party Claim and in ruling that she should file a separate reivindicatory action.
RULING
No, the NLRC did not commit grave abuse of discretion. The Court affirmed the rulings of the NLRC and the CA. The proper remedy for a third party claiming ownership over property levied upon execution is indeed to file a separate and independent reivindicatory action, not a third-party claim in the same labor case. This doctrine is well-established to prevent delay in the execution of final judgments. A third-party claim is merely ancillary to the execution proceeding and does not conclusively settle the question of ownership; its purpose is to require the sheriff to indemnify the judgment obligee if the property is later adjudged to belong to the third party.
The Court found no merit in Rufina’s argument that the property is conclusively hers because the title is in her name alone. While the phrase “married to Romeo J. Jorge” is descriptive, the determination of whether the property is conjugal or exclusively owned requires evidentiary proof that cannot be summarily resolved in a third-party claim proceeding. A full-blown trial in a separate action is the appropriate venue to thresh out conflicting claims of ownership. Furthermore, the NLRC correctly pointed out that Rufina failed to post the necessary supersedeas bond, which is mandatory to suspend the execution proceedings. Therefore, the NLRC’s denial of the Third Party Claim was in accordance with law and jurisprudence.
