G.R. No. L-23135 December 26, 1967
TESTATE ESTATE OF HILARION RAMAGOSA. MARIANO SUMILANG, petitioner-appellee, vs. SATURNINA RAMAGOSA, SANTIAGO RAMAGOSA, ENRIQUE PABELLA, LICERIA PABELLA and ANDREA RAVALO, oppositors-appellants.

FACTS

On July 5, 1960, Mariano Sumilang filed a petition for the probate of a document dated February 26, 1949, written in Tagalog, alleged to be the last will and testament of Hilarion Ramagosa, who died on December 1, 1959. The will instituted Sumilang as the sole heir. The petition was opposed by Saturnina Ramagosa, Santiago Ramagosa, Enrique Pabella, Liceria Pabella, and Andrea Ravalo. The Ramagosa oppositors specifically questioned the due execution of the will, claiming it was made under duress and not intended as a will, and also claimed they were entitled to inherit the estate. The other oppositors, as next of kin, simply prayed for the disallowance of the will. After petitioner Sumilang presented his evidence, oppositors moved to dismiss the probate petition on July 3, 1961, alleging the court lacked jurisdiction because the will was impliedly revoked by law six years before the testator’s death. They claimed that after making the will, Hilarion Ramagosa sold the parcels of land described therein to Mariano Sumilang and his brother, so the titles were no longer in the testator’s name at his death. Petitioner opposed the motion and later moved to strike out the oppositors’ pleadings on the grounds that they had no legal standing or personality to oppose the probate and no valid interest in the estate. On October 18, 1963, the lower court denied the motion to dismiss, stating the allegations went to the intrinsic value of the will, and granted the motion to strike, finding that the oppositors had no relationship within the fifth degree to the deceased and were therefore total strangers to the estate. Oppositors appealed.

ISSUE

1. Whether the alleged implied revocation of the will (by the testator’s sale of the devised properties during his lifetime) is a proper ground for dismissing the petition for probate.
2. Whether the oppositors-appellants have the legal personality or interest required to intervene in and oppose the probate proceedings.

RULING

1. No, the alleged implied revocation is not a ground for dismissing the probate petition. The probate court’s inquiry is limited to the extrinsic validity of the will, which includes the testator’s testamentary capacity and compliance with the formal requisites prescribed by law. Questions regarding the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the will’s provisions, including the alleged implied revocation through the sale of properties, are premature at the probate stage. Probate determines the execution and formal validity of the will; the validity of testamentary provisions relates to descent and distribution. An implied revocation from acts like conveyance does not affect the will itself but only the specific devise or legacy. Therefore, the motion to dismiss on this ground was correctly denied.
2. No, the oppositors-appellants lack the required legal interest to intervene. The lower court’s uncontradicted finding, based on certified copies of baptismal and marriage certificates, was that the oppositors had no relationship to the deceased within the fifth degree and were total strangers to the estate. They did not contest this finding. The well-settled rule is that only an interested party—one who would be benefited by the estate (such as an heir) or one who has a claim against it (such as a creditor)—may intervene in a probate proceeding. Strangers are excluded to prevent the courts and litigants from being molested by persons with no interest in the estate. Since oppositors failed to show any interest in the estate that must be protected, the lower court correctly struck out their opposition and pleadings.
The order appealed from is affirmed. Costs against oppositors-appellants.