G.R. No. 230383 , July 13, 2021
CARLOS B. LOZADA, RICARDO L. MEDALLA, JR., LLEWELYN A. VILLAMOR, ROWENA DL SAN GABRIEL, AND OCTAVIO F. LINA, PETITIONERS, VS. COMMISSION ON AUDIT AND MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY, RESPONDENTS.

FACTS

Petitioners are officials of the Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) held liable for various disallowed disbursements. After the disallowance cases became final, the Commission on Audit (COA) issued Orders of Execution (COEs) to enforce payment. MIAA, acting on the COEs, began deducting from the salaries of the petitioners who remained as MIAA employees, reducing their net take-home pay to a specified amount until full settlement. For those liable who had already resigned, MIAA referred collection to its legal department. Petitioners, aggrieved by these salary deductions, filed a petition directly with the Supreme Court to assail the constitutionality of Section 16.3 of COA Circular No. 006-09, which prescribes that the liability of persons determined liable under a Notice of Disallowance (ND) “shall be solidary and the Commission may go against any person liable without prejudice to the latter’s claim against the rest of the persons liable.” Petitioners argued that the implementation was unfair and burdensome because MIAA/COA enforced the liability only against them (incumbent officials) and not equally against those who had resigned, retired, or died, claiming this was “excessive, unreasonable and… unconscionable to human dignity” and a modification of the legal meaning of solidary liability.

ISSUE

Whether Section 16.3 of COA Circular No. 006-09 is unconstitutional for being excessive, unreasonable, and unconscionable, and for allegedly illegally modifying the concept of solidary liability under the law.

RULING

The Supreme Court DISMISSED the petition. The Court held that the petitioners failed to overcome the presumption of validity of the assailed COA Circular. Their allegations were vague, mere conclusions of law, and did not establish a clear and unequivocal breach of a specific constitutional provision. The Court further ruled that the petition lacked merit on substantive grounds. The solidary nature of the liability of approving/certifying officers for disallowed expenditures is expressly provided by law, specifically Section 43, Chapter 5, Book VI of the Administrative Code of 1987. As the obligation is solidary by law, the creditor (in this case, the government through COA/MIAA) may indeed enforce the entire obligation against any one of the solidary debtors without prejudice to that debtor’s right to claim reimbursement from the others. Therefore, COA/MIAA’s act of proceeding first against the petitioners (incumbent officials) was legally sound and in accordance with the nature of a solidary obligation under the Civil Code. The Court also noted that the petition, filed over a year after the implementation of the salary deductions, appeared to be a belated attempt to resist the COEs after more appropriate remedies had likely prescribed.