G.R. No. 227777 , June 15, 2020
Omar Villarba, Petitioner, vs. Court of Appeals and People of the Philippines, Respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Omar Villarba, along with other members of the Junior Order of Kalantiao fraternity, was charged with violating Republic Act No. 8049 (Anti-Hazing Act of 1995) for acts committed against Wilson Dordas III on or about September 15, 2001. The original Information alleged that they subjected Dordas to hazing, resulting in his confinement and inability to work for over 90 days. All accused were arraigned under this original Information and pleaded not guilty. Subsequently, the Information was amended by adding the suffix “III” to the victim’s name, “Wilson Dordas.” Pre-trial and trial proceeded without a new arraignment on the amended Information.
During trial, Dordas testified that Villarba recruited him, assuring him no physical harm would be involved. The initiation rites included humiliating tasks and, at a beach resort, involved punishments such as eating hot peppers, being slapped, punched in the stomach and waist, and having hot wax dripped on his body. Dordas suffered liver damage requiring surgery. Villarba admitted recruiting Dordas and the occurrence of final rites but claimed no physical harm was inflicted.
The Regional Trial Court convicted Villarba and his co-accused. On appeal, Villarba argued that the Information was invalid for failing to allege that the acts were “a prerequisite for admission into membership,” an essential element of hazing, and that his right to due process was violated by the lack of re-arraignment on the amended Information. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the amendment was merely formal and that the Information sufficiently informed the accused of the charge.

ISSUE

1. Whether the amendment of the Information by adding “III” to the victim’s name required a re-arraignment, thereby violating petitioner’s right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation.
2. Whether the Information was fatally defective for failing to allege that the acts complained of were committed as a prerequisite for admission into the fraternity.

RULING

The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the conviction.
1. On the amendment and re-arraignment: The amendment was merely formal. A formal amendment does not alter the crime charged or affect the accused’s theory of defense; it only rectifies something already included in the original information. Adding the suffix “III” to correctly state the victim’s full name did not change the nature of the charge, the essence of the offense, or deprive the accused of an opportunity to meet the new averment. Since Villarba, as the recruiter, knew the victim’s identity, a second arraignment was unnecessary. His constitutional right to be informed of the accusation was not violated.
2. On the sufficiency of the Information: The Information was sufficient. An information need not reproduce the law verbatim; it is sufficient if it states the acts or omissions constituting the offense in terms that are understood. The phrase “as a prerequisite for admission” is part of the statutory definition of hazing but is not an essential element that must be precisely alleged in the information. The Information clearly alleged that the accused, as fraternity members, subjected Dordas to hazing or initiation, causing physical suffering and injury. This adequately informed Villarba of the charge and the acts he needed to defend against. The failure to include the exact statutory phrase did not render the Information invalid.
The Court also found no merit in Villarba’s challenge to the credibility of Dordas’s testimony, upholding the factual findings of the lower courts. Therefore, the conviction for violation of the Anti-Hazing Act was sustained.