GR 22770 1924 (CRITIQUE)
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THE AI-ASSISTED CRITIQUE
The Court correctly identifies the jurisdictional error in the lower court’s order, as the Court of First Instance improperly assumed a function reserved for the justice of the peace. Under the procedural framework, the determination of a monthly rental value for deposit under Section 88 is a substantive component of the original judgment in a forcible entry case. By issuing an order to fix this amount de novo after appeal, the respondent judge effectively modified the judgment on a matter not appealed, thereby acting in excess of jurisdiction. This encroachment on the original court’s authority undermines the statutory division of functions between inferior and appellate courts in summary proceedings, making the order vulnerable to annulment.

However, the Court’s denial of the writ of certiorari based on futility is a sound application of the principle that extraordinary writs will not issue for vain or useless purposes. The petitioners’ failure to post the special bond mandated by statute meant execution for restitution of possession could proceed immediately as a matter of law, regardless of the erroneous order. The Court rightly notes that the order requiring the bond did not alter the petitioners’ legal position; it merely reiterated an existing statutory obligation. Thus, even if the writ were granted to nullify the order, it would provide no practical relief to the petitioners regarding possession, rendering the remedy nugatory under the doctrine of mootness as applied to certiorari.

The decision ultimately serves as a cautionary procedural lesson, emphasizing strict compliance with statutory appeal bonds in summary actions. While the lower court’s overreach is technically critiqued, the ruling reinforces that litigants cannot leverage procedural errors to escape substantive statutory consequences. The petitioners’ attempt to use certiorari to delay execution fails because their own non-compliance with Section 88 was the dispositive factor, not the court’s ancillary error. This prioritizes substantive statutory rights over procedural missteps, ensuring that the expedient nature of forcible entry actions is not undermined by appellate maneuvering.