G.R. No. L-22572 January 22, 1980
MARTINIANO P. VIVO, as Commissioner of Immigration, petitioner, vs. HON. JUAN O. REYES, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XXI; MACARIO OFILADA, as Clerk of Court and Ex-oficio Sheriff of Manila, and TIU TO KIAT, TAN SIO WAN alias Chan Sook Luen, TIU YET HIONG alias Chang Yik Hung and TIU CHI LU the last two minors represented by TIU TO KIAT, respondents.

FACTS

The Commissioner of Immigration sought to deport Tiu To Kiat’s wife and minor children, Tan Sio Wan, Tiu Yek Hiong, and Tiu Chi Lu, as overstaying aliens. Their authorized stay had expired, and a deportation order was issued. In response, the aliens filed a prohibition suit (Civil Case No. 51434) to restrain deportation, arguing that Tiu To Kiat had been naturalized as a Filipino citizen, thereby conferring derivative citizenship upon his wife and minor children. The Court of First Instance of Manila ruled in favor of the aliens, ordering the cancellation of their immigration papers and a refund of their bond. This 1963 decision became final and executory after the Commissioner failed to appeal.
Subsequent to this final judgment, the Commissioner filed the instant certiorari and prohibition petition to prevent its enforcement. Meanwhile, in a separate proceeding, Tiu To Kiat’s certificate of naturalization was cancelled by this Court in 1974 for failure to comply with legal requirements. However, it was later disclosed that Tiu To Kiat was subsequently granted citizenship under a Presidential Decree in 1976.

ISSUE

Whether the final and executory 1963 decision of the lower court, which restrained the deportation of the respondents based on derivative citizenship, can be declared void through a petition for certiorari and prohibition.

RULING

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition. The Court held that certiorari and prohibition are extraordinary writs that cannot substitute for a lost appeal. The lower court undeniably had jurisdiction over the prohibition case and to render the questioned decision. Since the Commissioner allowed the judgment to become final by not appealing, he cannot now assail it via certiorari. The explicit requirement under Rule 65 is that these writs are available only when “there is no appeal,” not when appeal was available but was not taken.
The supervening events—specifically the 1974 denaturalization of Tiu To Kiat and his subsequent reacquisition of citizenship in 1976—while potentially affecting the factual basis of the final judgment, were not proper subjects for resolution in this certiorari proceeding. Any question regarding whether these events rendered the execution of the judgment unjust or inequitable should be raised in the execution stage before the trial court, not via a collateral attack through an extraordinary writ. The petition was an improper remedy to attack a final judgment rendered by a court with jurisdiction.