GR 225035; (February, 2017) (Digest)
G.R. No. 225035 February 8, 2017
CARSON REALTY & MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, Petitioner vs. RED ROBIN SECURITY AGENCY and MONINA C. SANTOS, Respondents
FACTS
Respondent Monina C. Santos filed a complaint for sum of money against petitioner Carson Realty. The initial summons was served on a staff assistant, not an authorized corporate officer. Carson’s counsel, Atty. Tomas Roxas, filed an “Appearance and Motion” acknowledging receipt of the summons and requesting a 15-day extension to file a responsive pleading. The trial court granted the extension. Instead of filing an answer, Atty. Roxas moved to dismiss, arguing improper service. The trial court denied the motion and issued alias summons. Multiple attempts at service were made, with process servers eventually resorting to substituted service upon company employees, who refused acknowledgment. After another alias summons was left with a receptionist, who later manifested she had no authority to receive it, Santos moved to declare Carson in default. The trial court granted the motion and allowed ex-parte presentation of evidence.
ISSUE
Whether the trial court acquired jurisdiction over Carson Realty despite the alleged improper service of summons.
RULING
Yes, the trial court acquired jurisdiction. The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ ruling that Carson voluntarily submitted to the court’s jurisdiction. Jurisdiction over the defendant is acquired either by valid service of summons or voluntary appearance. While the initial service on a staff assistant was indeed improper under Section 11, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, Carson’s subsequent actions constituted a voluntary appearance. By filing an “Appearance and Motion” through counsel, specifically requesting an affirmative relief in the form of a 15-day extension to file a pleading, Carson effectively recognized the court’s authority and waived any defect in the service of summons. The Court cited precedent, such as La Naval Drug Corporation v. Court of Appeals, which holds that seeking an extension of time to file a pleading is a voluntary submission to the court’s jurisdiction. This voluntary appearance is equivalent to service of summons under Section 20, Rule 14. Consequently, the default order was valid, and Carson’s subsequent motions to set it aside, filed only after an adverse judgment was rendered, were correctly denied for being dilatory. The Court emphasized that a party cannot seek affirmative relief from the court and simultaneously challenge its jurisdiction.