G.R. No. 224946 , November 9, 2021
CHRISTIAN PANTONIAL ACHARON, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

FACTS

Petitioner Christian Pantonial Acharon was charged with violating Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262 (the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004) for allegedly failing to provide financial support to his wife, AAA, with the intent to cause her mental or emotional anguish. The prosecution’s evidence showed that while petitioner failed to remit the full amount of a P85,000.00 loan with interest, he had sent a total of P71,000.00 as payment. Petitioner presented justifiable reasons for his failure to provide full support, specifically that his apartment in Brunei was razed by fire and he met a vehicular accident, incidents which required significant expenditure.

ISSUE

The primary issue addressed in the Separate Concurring Opinion is whether the petitioner should be acquitted of the charge under Section 5(i) of RA 9262. A corollary doctrinal issue is whether the rulings in Melgar v. People and Reyes v. People—which allowed a person charged under Section 5(i) to be convicted under Section 5(e) of the same law pursuant to the variance doctrine—should be abandoned.

RULING

The Separate Concurring Opinion concurs in the result to ACQUIT the petitioner. The prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt the fourth element of the crime under Section 5(i) of RA 9262: that the accused’s failure to provide support was done with the specific intent to cause mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule, or humiliation. The evidence showed justifiable reasons for the partial non-payment and a demonstrated effort to fulfill the obligation.
Doctrinally, the Opinion concurs in abandoning the rulings in Melgar and Reyes. It holds that a violation of Section 5(i) cannot be considered to include or be included in a violation of Section 5(e) because the specific intents required for each offense are fundamentally different (intent to cause mental/emotional anguish vs. intent to control or restrict movement/conduct). Therefore, the variance doctrine under Sections 4 and 5, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure does not apply.
Furthermore, the Opinion elaborates that the types of violence listed in Section 3(a) of RA 9262 (physical, sexual, psychological, economic) are not themselves the punishable acts or means of commission. Instead, they are the resulting effects or forms of harm caused by the acts punished under Section 5. The acts under Section 5 are the punishable offenses. Consequently, a single act under Section 5 can result in multiple types of violence under Section 3(a), and there is no exclusive correspondence between a specific Section 5 act and a specific type of violence.