G.R. No. 224469 , January 5, 2021
DIOSDADO SAMA Y HINUPAS AND BANDY MASANGLAY Y ACEVEDA, PETITIONERS, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

FACTS

This case stemmed from an Information dated May 27, 2005, charging petitioners Diosdado Sama and Bandy Masanglay with violation of Section 77 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 705 (the Revised Forestry Code). The petitioners were allegedly caught in flagrante delicto unlawfully and knowingly logging a dita tree using an unregistered power chainsaw without any authority. The petitioners, who claimed to be Iraya-Mangyan Indigenous Peoples (IPs), admitted cutting the dita tree within their ancestral domain but asserted it was for constructing a community toilet, a project initiated by a Non-Government Organization. The Regional Trial Court convicted the petitioners, ruling the cutting without a permit was a violation of PD No. 705, a malum prohibitum. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction. However, the ponencia (main decision) acquitted the petitioners.

ISSUE

The core legal issue addressed in the dissenting opinion is whether the Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act (IPRA) categorically and specifically grants indigenous peoples the authority to cut, gather, collect, or remove timber or other forest products free from criminal liability under Section 77 of PD No. 705, thereby creating an exception to its permit requirement.

RULING

The dissenting opinion answers the issue in the negative. It holds that IPRA does not exempt indigenous peoples from the permit requirements and penal provisions of PD No. 705. The dissent argues that:
1. The language of Section 77 of PD No. 705 is clear and covers “any person” who cuts forest products without authority, with no distinction or exemption for indigenous peoples.
2. The legislature, in enacting PD No. 705, had already considered indigenous groups, and they can be penalized under its provisions.
3. IPRA grants indigenous peoples “priority rights” in the harvesting and development of natural resources within ancestral domains (Sec. 57) but does not mention any exemption from the licensing requirements of forestry laws.
4. IPRA also imposes obligations on indigenous peoples to conserve natural resources and maintain ecological balance, which includes following laws aimed at preventing unregulated logging.
5. Interpreting IPRA as an implicit authority or exception to PD No. 705 would violate the rule of strict interpretation against exceptions. Had the legislature intended such an exemption, it would have expressly stated it, as it did with tax exemptions for ancestral domains (Sec. 60 of IPRA).
6. Mere confusion arising from new legal developments (like the recognition of IP rights) is not a valid basis for acquittal when the law’s text and intent do not establish an exemption. The case of Saguin v. People is distinguished, as there was a clear legal basis (devolution of functions) for the accused’s belief that their duty had ceased.
Therefore, the dissent maintains that the petitioners should not be acquitted based on an unproven exemption and that their conviction should stand.