G.R. No. 223862 , July 10, 2017
HON. MYLYN P. CAYABYAB, et al. vs. JAIME C. DIMSON

FACTS

Respondent Jaime Dimson owned a poultry farm operating for over 30 years. In 2014, he applied for a barangay clearance to secure a business permit. The barangay chairman conditioned the clearance on an ocular inspection by the mayor’s office. Despite the inspection, the clearance was withheld, preventing the issuance of a business permit. Subsequently, Mayor Cayabyab issued a Cease and Desist Order (CDO) against the farm, citing lack of permits, absence of a pollution control officer, foul odor complaints, and a zoning violation for being within five meters of a national road, contrary to the Sanitation Code’s 500-meter requirement. Dimson’s motions for reconsideration were denied, and a Closure Order was issued, shutting down the farm.
Dimson filed a Petition for Certiorari, Mandamus, and Prohibition with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), seeking a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) against the CDO and Closure Order. He argued his farm was not a nuisance per se that could be summarily abated without judicial intervention. The RTC denied the TRO application, finding no clear right to its issuance and noting the closure was already a fait accompli. The Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the RTC, directing it to issue a TRO upon bond posting, holding that the poultry farm, as a legitimate business, could only be a nuisance per accidens abatable by courts, not by executive fiat alone.

ISSUE

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in directing the issuance of a TRO against the implementation of the Cease and Desist Order and Closure Order issued by the municipal mayor.

RULING

The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the CA Decision. The legal logic centers on the distinction between a nuisance per se and a nuisance per accidens. A nuisance per se is an act, occupation, or structure which is a nuisance at all times and under any circumstances, regardless of location or surroundings, and may be summarily abated by executive action. In contrast, a nuisance per accidens is one that becomes a nuisance by reason of circumstances, location, or surroundings, and its existence requires judicial determination.
The Court ruled that a poultry farm is a legitimate business enterprise. By its nature alone, it is not a nuisance per se. It may only be considered a nuisance per accidens if, in its operation, it violates laws or endangers public health, but such a determination must be made by a court of law. The mayor’s closure of the farm based on alleged violations (e.g., foul odor, zoning) constituted an abatement of a purported nuisance per accidens without the requisite judicial order. This was a grave abuse of discretion. The general welfare clause empowering local executives does not authorize the summary abatement of a business that is not a nuisance per se. Therefore, Dimson established a clear legal right to the injunctive relief to prevent the continuing prohibition of his lawful business pending judicial proceedings. The TRO was proper to preserve the status quo and prevent irreparable injury.