G.R. No. 218413 . June 06, 2018
FELICIANO S. PASOK, JR., PETITIONER, V. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMANMINDANAO AND REX Y. DUA, RESPONDENTS.

FACTS

Petitioner Feliciano S. Pasok, Jr., the Municipal Agriculturist of Tandag, Surigao del Sur, was charged by respondent Rex Y. Dua, an Agricultural Technician, with Malversation and violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 . The complaint alleged irregularities in several agricultural programs, including the non-remittance of project proceeds to the LGU trust fund, non-delivery of farm inputs to beneficiaries, personal use of a water pump from a calamity program, and manipulation in the award of a rice harvester to a fictitious farmers’ association allegedly headed by Pasok’s tenant. Pasok denied the charges, attributing malice to Dua due to a denied promotion and asserting that other personnel were responsible for the implicated projects.
The Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao initially found probable cause and found Pasok administratively liable. However, upon Pasok’s motion, it issued a Joint-Order in 2009 setting aside its prior rulings and directing the Commission on Audit (COA) to conduct a fact-finding audit on the rice harvester procurement, holding the preliminary investigation in abeyance pending the COA report. Subsequently, without awaiting the COA report, the Ombudsman issued an Order in 2013 finding probable cause against Pasok for violation of R.A. No. 3019 , which it affirmed in a 2015 Joint-Order.

ISSUE

Whether the Office of the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in finding probable cause against Pasok despite its prior order holding the investigation in abeyance pending a COA report.

RULING

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, affirming the Ombudsman’s orders. The Court held that the Ombudsman did not commit grave abuse of discretion. The legal logic centers on the Ombudsman’s constitutionally mandated independence and plenary investigative powers. The Court emphasized that the Ombudsman has the sole authority to determine the necessity of a COA report for its investigation. Its initial directive to await the report was a discretionary act to aid its inquiry, not a mandatory precondition that bound its subsequent actions.
The Ombudsman retains the prerogative to proceed with a preliminary investigation if it later determines that a COA report is no longer essential for establishing probable cause. In this case, the Ombudsman validly exercised this discretion, finding the submitted evidenceincluding certifications and letters from local officialssufficient to establish probable cause for violation of R.A. No. 3019 without the COA findings. The Court ruled that this shift in procedural approach, based on its independent assessment, did not violate Pasok’s right to due process or equal protection, nor did it constitute capricious or whimsical exercise of power amounting to grave abuse of discretion. The Court consistently defers to the Ombudsman’s findings on probable cause in the absence of a clear showing of such abuse.