G.R. Nos. 217126-27, November 10, 2015
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES, IN HER CAPACITY AS THE OMBUDSMAN, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS (SIXTH DIVISION) AND JEJOMAR ERWIN S. BINAY, JR., RESPONDENTS.

FACTS

On July 22, 2014, a complaint was filed before the Office of the Ombudsman against Jejomar Erwin S. Binay, Jr., then Mayor of Makati City, and other city officials, accusing them of Plunder and violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act in connection with the procurement and construction of the Makati City Hall Parking Building. After investigation, the Ombudsman filed six administrative and six criminal cases against Binay, Jr. et al. on March 5, 2015. The administrative charges were for Grave Misconduct, Serious Dishonesty, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service. The Ombudsman alleged that Binay, Jr., during his first term (2010-2013), issued awards and approved payments for Phases III, IV, and V of the project without the required publication and architectural designs, and during his second term (2013-2016), approved the release of remaining funds for Phase V and for design services.
On March 10, 2015, the Ombudsman issued a Joint Order placing Binay, Jr. and the other respondents under preventive suspension for six months without pay, pending the investigation. The Ombudsman found the evidence of guilt strong and that the charges, if proven, warranted removal, and that their positions allowed them to influence witnesses and records.
On March 11, 2015, Binay, Jr. filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA) seeking to nullify the preventive suspension order and praying for a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction (WPI). He argued that his re-election in 2013 condoned any administrative liability for acts committed during his first term, applying the “condonation doctrine,” and that the evidence against him was not strong.
On March 16, 2015, the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG) implemented the suspension order, and Vice Mayor Romulo Peña, Jr. assumed office as Acting Mayor. Later that day, the CA issued a Resolution granting a TRO against the implementation of the suspension order. Binay, Jr. also filed a petition for contempt against officials for implementing the order despite the TRO.
The CA later issued a Writ of Preliminary Injunction. The Ombudsman then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the Supreme Court, assailing the CA’s Resolutions granting the TRO and the WPI, and ordering the Ombudsman to comment on the contempt petition.

ISSUE

The primary issue is whether the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in granting the TRO and the WPI against the implementation of the Ombudsman’s preventive suspension order against Binay, Jr.

RULING

The Supreme Court GRANTED the Ombudsman’s petition. The Court ruled that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the TRO and the WPI.
The Supreme Court held that the Ombudsman did not commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the preventive suspension order. The Court found that the Ombudsman’s factual determination that the evidence of guilt was strong was supported by the records, including affidavits and documents showing irregularities in the bidding and payment processes for the parking building project. The Court also held that the charges of Grave Misconduct, Serious Dishonesty, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, if proven, warranted removal from service, and that Binay, Jr.’s position as Mayor gave him access to records and potential influence over witnesses, justifying preventive suspension.
Crucially, the Supreme Court abandoned the “condonation doctrine.” The Court ruled that the doctrine, which held that a public official’s re-election absolves them of administrative liability for acts committed during a prior term, is bereft of legal basis. The Court declared that the doctrine is inconsistent with the Constitution, laws, and jurisprudence that uphold public accountability. It noted that the doctrine originated from a 1959 case (Pascual v. Hon. Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija) which relied on inapplicable American rulings and had been erroneously perpetuated. The Court held that administrative liability is not extinguished by re-election, as the misconduct remains a stain on the public official’s integrity and the public office.
Therefore, Binay, Jr.’s defense of condonation was invalid. His re-election did not bar the administrative cases against him for acts allegedly committed during his first term. The CA’s reliance on the condonation doctrine to justify injunctive relief was a grave abuse of discretion.
The Supreme Court made the WPI permanent, set aside the CA’s Resolutions, and reinstated the Ombudsman’s preventive suspension order. The Court also directed the CA to proceed with the resolution of Binay, Jr.’s petition for certiorari with dispatch, uninfluenced by the abandoned condonation doctrine. The petition for contempt before the CA was rendered moot by the Supreme Court’s ruling.