G.R. No. 216714 . April 4, 2018.
SPOUSES GODFREY and MA. TERESA TEVES, Petitioners, vs. INTEGRATED CREDIT & CORPORATE SERVICES, CO. (now CAROL AQUI), Respondent.

FACTS

Petitioners obtained loans from Standard Chartered Bank, secured by a mortgage on their property. Upon default, the bank extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage. The property was sold to Integrated Credit and Corporate Services Co. (ICCS), and after the redemption period lapsed on May 23, 2007, a new title was issued to ICCS. ICCS filed an ex parte petition for a writ of possession, which was granted by the Regional Trial Court (RTC). During proceedings, respondent Carol Aqui was substituted as the new owner. The RTC later issued a Second Order, directing petitioners to deliver or deposit with the court the monthly rentals (₱50,000) they collected from the property from May 24, 2007, until they surrender possession, citing Article 544 of the Civil Code.
Petitioners moved for partial reconsideration, arguing that a notice of lis pendens from a separate annulment case in Makati was annotated on the title, and that a subsequent compromise agreement in that case, where the bank waived all claims, should bind respondent as a successor-in-interest. The RTC denied the motion, and the Court of Appeals dismissed petitioners’ certiorari petition, prompting this appeal.

ISSUE

Whether the RTC, in an ex parte proceeding for a writ of possession, acted with grave abuse of discretion in ordering petitioners to surrender the collected rentals from the time the redemption period lapsed.

RULING

The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the assailed orders. The legal logic is clear: an ex parte petition for a writ of possession under Act No. 3135 is a summary, non-litigious proceeding. The court’s duty to issue the writ is ministerial once the foreclosure sale is confirmed and the redemption period has expired. The RTC, however, exceeded its jurisdiction by issuing the Second Order for surrender of rentals. This directive converted the simple possessory proceeding into an adjudication of ownership and a claim for sum of money, which are substantive issues requiring a proper ordinary action.
The Court held that while a purchaser at an extrajudicial foreclosure sale is entitled to possession, any claim for fruits or rentals accruing after the sale must be pursued in a separate, ordinary action. The RTC’s reliance on Article 544 of the Civil Code was misplaced within the confines of the ex parte proceeding. The proper remedy for respondent was to file a separate civil case for collection or accion publiciana. Consequently, the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the Second Order. The Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the petition for certiorari, as the proper recourse for petitioners from the void order was an appeal, not certiorari, given that other appealable orders had been issued in the case.