GR 216603 CAguioa (Digest)
G.R. No. 216603 , December 5, 2023
JAIME MANUEL N. LEGARDA, PETITIONER, VS. CLERK OF COURT OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MUNTINLUPA CITY AND BENJAMIN CALAWAGAN, RESPONDENTS.
FACTS
Petitioner Jaime Manuel N. Legarda was the assignee of all rights and interests from the highest bidder in a foreclosure sale. After the redemption period expired without any redemption being made, Legarda demanded the respondent Clerk of Court, acting as an ex-officio sheriff, to issue a final certificate of sale in his name as assignee. The respondent refused, prompting Legarda to file a petition for mandamus to compel the issuance.
The core dispute centered on the proper interpretation of Section 33, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which governs the issuance of a final deed of conveyance after an execution sale. The provision states that the “purchaser” or the “last redemptioner” is entitled to the conveyance, omitting any reference to an “assignee.” This omission was critical, as the previous 1964 Rules of Court had expressly included “assignee” in the list of parties entitled to the final deed.
ISSUE
Whether a writ of mandamus lies to compel the Clerk of Court to issue a final certificate of sale in favor of the assignee of the purchaser at a foreclosure sale.
RULING
The Supreme Court, through the ponencia and concurring opinions, denied the petition, holding that mandamus does not lie. The legal logic is anchored on the nature of mandamus as a remedy to compel the performance of a ministerial duty where the petitioner has a clear legal right. The Court found that Legarda, as an assignee, possessed no such clear and indubitable right under the prevailing rules.
The decisive factor was the deliberate deletion of the word “assignee” from the current Section 33, Rule 39. Under statutory construction, an amendment by deletion is presumed to intend a change in the law. By omitting “assignee,” the 1997 Rules evinced a clear intent to limit the right to a final conveyance solely to the original purchaser at the auction or the last redemptioner. Consequently, the duty of the sheriff to issue the certificate is ministerial only when the claimant is the purchaser or last redemptioner personally. An assignment introduces a new transaction—a private conveyance between parties—that requires judicial verification of its validity and the assignee’s rights. Compelling the sheriff to issue the deed to an assignee would necessitate an exercise of discretion to examine this extrinsic agreement, a task beyond the scope of a purely ministerial duty. Therefore, the respondent Clerk of Court had no ministerial duty to issue the certificate in Legarda’s name, and the extraordinary writ of mandamus was improperly sought. The proper recourse for the assignee is to seek judicial confirmation of the assignment and an order for the issuance of the deed.
