GR 21644; (May, 1970) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-21644 May 29, 1970
WENCESLAO PASCUAL, plaintiff, vs. PILAR BAUTISTA, ET AL., defendants. PILAR BAUTISTA, third party plaintiff-appellee, vs. MARIANO R. FLORES, third party defendant-appellant.
FACTS
In Civil Case No. 5203 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Wenceslao Pascual sued Pilar Bautista and others. Bautista filed a third-party complaint against Mariano R. Flores. Flores failed to answer and was declared in default. On March 7, 1951, the trial court rendered judgment, ordering Bautista to pay Pascual certain sums and, on Bautista’s third-party complaint, ordering Flores to pay Bautista P500,000 as liquidated damages and P50,000 as attorney’s fees. All parties except Flores appealed to the Court of Appeals, which modified the judgment on February 16, 1953. Bautista and Pascual then appealed to the Supreme Court (G.R. Nos. L-6569 and L-6576), which affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision on April 18, 1956. The Supreme Court’s decision was entered in the Clerk of Court’s book on June 6, 1957. Bautista obtained writs of execution against Flores, but they were returned unsatisfied. On June 24, 1961, the trial court set aside an order for Flores’s examination and an outstanding writ, ruling that more than ten years had elapsed since the March 7, 1951 judgment against Flores, barring execution under Rule 39, Sec. 6. On November 21, 1961, Bautista filed a separate action (Civil Case No. 48819) to revive the judgment against Flores. Flores argued the judgment had prescribed. The trial court granted revival, declaring the Supreme Court’s decision in G.R. Nos. L-6569 and L-6576 revived.
ISSUE
Which judgment is subject to revival for execution against third-party defendant Mariano R. Flores: the Court of First Instance’s default judgment rendered on March 7, 1951, or the Supreme Court’s decision promulgated on April 18, 1956?
RULING
The Court of First Instance’s default judgment of March 7, 1951 is the judgment subject to revival, and the action to revive it filed on November 21, 1961, was filed beyond the ten-year period and is barred. The Supreme Court’s decision of April 18, 1956, did not affect Flores, as he did not appeal from the 1951 default judgment. The undisputed facts are: (1) Flores did not appeal from the 1951 default judgment; all other parties did. Thus, the decisions of the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court did not affect him. (2) The 1951 default judgment against Flores was immediately final and executory under the law then in force (Rule 35, Section 7 of the original Rules of Court), as it was a judgment by default and not appealable. Bautista’s cause of action against Flores, based on a specific contract clause, was independent of the outcome of the main action between Pascual and Bautista. The clause obligated Flores to pay liquidated damages if Nelly Montilla de Lovina refused or failed to execute a deed of sale. Since Lovina so refused or failed, Bautista’s right to recover from Flores vested upon the trial court’s 1951 default judgment. That judgment became final and executory as to Flores on March 7, 1951. Therefore, the ten-year period for enforcing it by motion or action began to run from that date. The action for revival filed on November 21, 1961, was filed more than ten years later and was untimely. The trial court’s order of revival is reversed.
