G.R. No. 216157 , October 14, 2019
MARIA PEREZ, PETITIONER, V. MANOTOK REALTY, INC., RESPONDENT.

FACTS

Respondent Manotok Realty, Inc. filed an unlawful detainer case against petitioner Maria Perez. The Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) rendered a decision in favor of respondent on March 31, 1998. After it became final, a writ of execution was issued on October 1, 1998. The parties later entered into a Compromise Agreement, which the MeTC approved in a Decision dated July 15, 1999. Petitioner violated the agreement, prompting respondent to move for execution, which the MeTC granted on May 4, 2001. However, the sheriff reported on July 19, 2004 that the writ was not implemented due to a written communication from petitioner’s counsel citing a pending petition before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). That RTC petition was eventually dismissed, and the dismissal was affirmed with finality by the Supreme Court on November 17, 2008. On April 28, 2010, respondent filed a Motion to Enforce Writ of Execution before the MeTC. The MeTC initially granted it but, upon petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, set aside its order, ruling that the motion was filed beyond the 5-year period for execution by motion under Rule 39, Section 6. The RTC reversed the MeTC, holding the judgment could still be enforced by motion. The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC.

ISSUE

Whether the judgment in favor of respondent can be executed by a mere motion even after the lapse of five years from its finality.

RULING

Yes. The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the Court of Appeals. Under Section 6, Rule 39, a final judgment may be executed by motion within five years from entry. After five years, it may be enforced by action before being barred by the statute of limitations. However, the Court has allowed execution by motion even after five years upon meritorious grounds. The general rule is that the time during which execution is stayed or interrupted by the judgment debtor’s acts is excluded from the computation of the five-year period. In this case, the delays in execution were caused by petitioner’s own initiatives for her advantage, such as filing a petition before the RTC and her counsel’s communication to the sheriff, which effectively suspended the enforcement. Respondent diligently pursued execution and did not sleep on its rights. Therefore, the five-year period was deemed effectively interrupted, and execution by motion remained proper. The purpose of the time limitation is to prevent parties from sleeping on their rights, not to deprive a diligent prevailing party of the fruits of a final judgment.