G.R. No. 210816 & 210854. December 10, 2018.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and PURITA HIBE, et al., Petitioners, vs. EDGAR S. GO, Respondent.

FACTS

On June 20, 2008, M/V Princess of the Stars, owned by Sulpicio Lines, Inc. (SLI), was scheduled to sail from Manila to Cebu despite Typhoon Frank. Prior to departure, SLI’s Manila Port Captain and the ship’s master reviewed weather bulletins and, with Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) approval, opted for an alternate route to avoid storm signals. The vessel departed at 8:04 p.m. Weather updates received during the voyage indicated the typhoon was moving away. However, by morning, the typhoon’s path shifted. The ship’s master attempted to take shelter but the vessel was caught in the storm, listed, and eventually capsized in the Sibuyan Sea, resulting in numerous deaths.
An Information for reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicide and physical injuries was filed against Edgar S. Go, then President and CEO of SLI. The Regional Trial Court denied his motion to quash, but the Court of Appeals granted his petition for certiorari and dismissed the charge. The CA ruled that criminal liability should attach only to the ship’s captain and crew directly responsible for navigation, not to corporate officers like Go, based on the doctrine of respondent superior. The People and the victims’ heirs filed these consolidated petitions for review.

ISSUE

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the criminal charge for reckless imprudence against respondent Edgar S. Go.

RULING

Yes. The Supreme Court reversed the CA and reinstated the criminal case. The CA incorrectly applied the principle of respondent superior, which pertains to an employer’s vicarious civil liability in tort, not to the determination of criminal liability. Criminal liability is personal. An officer of a common carrier can be held criminally liable for reckless imprudence if their own negligence, whether by action or omission, contributes to the accident.
The Court found that the allegations in the Information, deemed hypothetically admitted in a motion to quash, sufficiently charged Go with personal negligence. It was alleged that he, as the highest-ranking officer, failed to exercise the extraordinary diligence required of a common carrier. His alleged failure to cancel the voyage despite knowledge of the severe weather forecast, and his act of allowing or ordering the ship to sail, constituted a direct breach of this duty. This personal omission, if proven, could establish his criminal negligence separate from the crew’s actions. The civil liability of the corporation for breach of contract of carriage does not bar the criminal prosecution of its negligent employees or officers.