GR 21036; (June, 1977) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-21036 June 30, 1977
COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS FOR MANILA, and EMPLOYEES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES vs. HON. JUDGE GAUDENCIO CLORIBEL and JOSE and SUSANA COCHINGYAN
FACTS
A special civil action for declaratory relief (Civil Case No. 52318) was pending before respondent Judge Gaudencio Cloribel, involving Macario Ofilada, the Second Receiver of World War II Veterans Enterprises, Inc. (Warvets), and respondents Jose and Susana Cochingyan. The case sought a judicial declaration on the proper exchange rate for converting dollar prices of reparations goods allocated to Warvets. In a related receivership case (Civil Case No. 34998), an order dated October 9, 1962, directed Ofilada to deliver a shipment of goods to the Cochingyans. However, a motion for reconsideration of this release order was filed and, on February 9, 1963, Judge Francisco Arca issued an order holding all pending incidents, including the motion for reconsideration, in abeyance pending settlement negotiations. This effectively froze the October 9 release order.
Despite the declaratory relief case being already tried and nearly ready for decision, and despite the freeze order in the related case, the Cochingyans filed an ex-parte motion on February 13, 1963, in Civil Case No. 52318 before Judge Cloribel, seeking leave to file a third-party complaint for mandamus against the customs officials to compel release of the goods. Respondent judge immediately granted the motion, admitted the complaint, and issued an ex-parte writ of preliminary mandatory injunction on the same day, ordering the release of the goods. Subsequent orders were issued to enforce this writ.
ISSUE
Whether the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in allowing the filing of a third-party complaint for mandamus and issuing an ex-parte preliminary mandatory injunction in a declaratory relief action that was already tried and submitted for decision.
RULING
Yes, the Supreme Court annulled the respondent judge’s orders for being issued with grave abuse of discretion. The legal logic is twofold. First, the allowance of the third-party complaint was procedurally improper. A third-party complaint is governed by specific rules, which require that the claim arise from the same transaction as the plaintiff’s claim or that the third-party defendant would be liable to the plaintiff for all or part of the claim. The Cochingyans’ third-party complaint for mandamus to compel the release of goods did not arise from or connect to the original action for declaratory relief regarding exchange rates; they were distinct causes of action. Furthermore, under the then applicable Rules (Rule 12, Section 2), a motion for leave to file a third-party complaint after the service of an answer must be made on notice to the plaintiff. The ex-parte grant of the motion after the trial had already concluded was a blatant procedural error.
Second, the issuance of the ex-parte preliminary mandatory injunction was a patent abuse. A preliminary mandatory injunction, which commands the performance of a particular act, is an extraordinary remedy granted only in clear cases of right and to prevent irreparable injury. The respondent judge issued it without a hearing, ignoring the fact that the very order authorizing the release of the goods (the October 9 order) had been effectively suspended by Judge Arca’s February 9 order holding it in abeyance. By compelling the release through injunction, respondent judge arrogated unto himself the authority to resolve a matter that was pending and frozen in another branch of the same court, violating judicial comity and orderly procedure. Consequently, all assailed orders were declared null and void.
