G.R. No. 206513 , October 20, 2015
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. JOSE D. VILLAFLOR, JR., Accused-Appellant.

FACTS

The case involves the interpretation of Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 968 (the Probation Law of 1976, as amended). The specific legal question is whether an appellate court’s downgrading of a convict’s offense or penalty—from a non-probationable to a probationable one—subsequently entitles the accused to apply for probation despite having previously perfected an appeal. The provision states that “no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction.” Historically, the Court strictly interpreted this to bar a convicted felon from applying for probation if he filed an appeal, as established in Francisco v. Court of Appeals. However, in Colinares v. People (December 2011), the Court adopted a different interpretation, ruling that an appellate court’s downward modification of a penalty to a probationable one amounts to an original conviction for a probationable penalty, thus allowing the offender to apply for probation even after an appeal, provided the appeal was made when probation was not yet available. In the present case, the majority opinion deviated from Colinares by imposing additional restrictions: it held that for an accused to be allowed to apply for probation after an appeal, the appeal must be anchored only on (1) correction of the penalty to a probationable one, or (2) review of the crime to a lesser necessarily included offense with a probationable penalty, and must not question the finding of guilt or insist on acquittal.

ISSUE

Whether an accused who perfected an appeal from a judgment of conviction is entitled to apply for probation after the appellate court downgrades the offense or penalty to a probationable one, and if so, under what conditions.

RULING

The dissenting opinion of Justice Velasco, Jr. argues that the Court’s holding in Colinares should be sustained. It posits that the disqualification under Section 4 of the Probation Law applies only to offenders who were already qualified to apply for probation at the time of the trial court’s judgment but opted to appeal instead. When an appellate court modifies a conviction to a probationable offense or penalty, it constitutes an original conviction for a probationable penalty from which no appeal has been taken, thus qualifying the convict for probation. The dissent rejects the majority’s imposition of additional restrictions—that the appeal must not challenge the finding of guilt and must be limited to specific grounds—as contrary to the spirit of the Probation Law. It emphasizes that the law’s preambulatory clause targets qualified convicted offenders who show lack of repentance by appealing; thus, a formerly disqualified offender who becomes qualified after a meritorious appeal should not be barred. The dissent concludes that the petition should be granted, allowing the application for probation under the principles set forth in Colinares.