G.R. No. 204926 , December 3, 2014
ANACLETO C. MANGASER, represented by his Attorney-in-fact EUSTAQUIO DUGENIA, Petitioner, vs. DIONISIO UGAY, Respondent.

FACTS

Petitioner Anacleto Mangaser, represented by his attorney-in-fact Eustaquio Dugenia, filed a complaint for Forcible Entry with Damages against respondent Dionisio Ugay before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Caba, La Union. Petitioner alleged he was the registered owner and possessor of a parcel of land covered by OCT No. RP-174 (FP-13 787) and Tax Declaration No. 014-00707. He claimed that on October 31, 2006, he discovered respondent had stealthily intruded and occupied a portion of his property by constructing a residential house without his knowledge and consent. Conciliation at the Lupong Tagapamayapa failed, and demand letters were ignored, prompting the lawsuit. Respondent denied the allegations, asserting he had been a resident and occupant of the land since childhood, cultivating it and erecting a “bahay kubo” and fence in 2006. He contended he based the boundaries on concrete monuments and his recollection of petitioner’s property limits, and offered to vacate if shown he had intruded into petitioner’s titled lot. The MTC dismissed the complaint, ruling petitioner failed to prove the occupied lot was within his titled property or his prior physical possession, noting the lack of a relocation survey. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) reversed the MTC, holding petitioner’s title and tax declaration evidenced possession, and ordered respondent to vacate, remove improvements, and pay attorney’s fees. The Court of Appeals (CA) reinstated the MTC decision, emphasizing that forcible entry requires prior physical possession (possession de facto), not merely legal possession derived from ownership documents like a title or tax declaration.

ISSUE

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that petitioner failed to establish prior physical possession of the property, which is essential in a forcible entry case.

RULING

The Supreme Court granted the petition and reversed the CA decision. The Court held that while prior physical possession is indispensable in forcible entry cases, the presentation of a certificate of title can sufficiently establish such prior possession. Ownership itself can be the basis for recovering possession if the owner can prove a better right to possess. In this case, petitioner’s OCT No. RP-174 (FP-13 787) and tax declarations, which dated back to 1995, constituted conclusive evidence of his ownership and prior constructive possession. The Court cited jurisprudence stating that a Torrens title holder is entitled to possession as a necessary attribute of ownership. Respondent’s claim of prior physical possession was unsubstantiated, as he failed to present any proof of ownership or a superior right to possess. The Court also noted that the one-year filing period for forcible entry was complied with, as the action was filed within one year from petitioner’s discovery of the intrusion. The CA’s reliance on Quizon v. Juan was misplaced, as that case involved a mere claim of ownership without supporting title. Here, petitioner’s titled ownership justified a ruling in his favor. The Court reinstated the RTC decision, ordering respondent to vacate the property, remove improvements, and pay attorney’s fees. The Court further ruled that the CA resolution denying reconsideration was valid, as it complied with constitutional requirements by stating the legal basis for denial.