GR 204047; (January, 2016) (Digest)
G.R. No. 204047 , January 13, 2016
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. ALEXANDER “SANDER” BANGSOY, Accused-Appellant.
FACTS
The accused-appellant, Alexander Bangsoy, was convicted by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio City for two counts of statutory rape committed against his niece, AAA, a minor with mild mental retardation. The RTC found AAA’s testimony credible, wherein she narrated that Bangsoy, on two occasions in April 2004, inserted his penis into her vagina while she was sleeping, gagged her mouth with a cloth, and threatened her with a knife to prevent her from reporting the acts. The RTC rejected Bangsoy’s defense of denial and alibi, sentencing him to reclusion perpetua without parole for each count. The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC’s judgment in its entirety, upholding AAA’s positive identification and straightforward testimony despite her mental condition, and ruling that the absence of hymenal lacerations and the presence of other sleeping family members during the incidents do not negate the commission of rape.
ISSUE
The core issue is whether the prosecution proved the guilt of the accused-appellant beyond reasonable doubt for two counts of rape.
RULING
The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction for the first count of rape (Criminal Case No. 24761-R) but acquitted the appellant for the second count (Criminal Case No. 24762-R). For the first count, the Court held that all elements of rape under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code were established. The prosecution proved carnal knowledge through AAA’s clear, credible, and unwavering testimony, which was consistent with the findings of the trial and appellate courts. Crucially, the prosecution established AAA’s status as a mental retardate through the Psychological Report, which classified her with mild mental retardation and a mental age of seven years. For a victim with this condition, carnal knowledge alone constitutes rape, as she is legally incapable of giving consent; proof of force or intimidation becomes unnecessary. The Court found her testimony, including the identification of the appellant as her uncle and assailant, to be credible and untainted by fabrication, given her mental state.
However, for the second count, the Court found reasonable doubt. AAA’s testimony for this incident was inconsistent and insufficient. She initially stated the second act occurred while her father and brother were sleeping beside her, but later testified she was alone. The Court ruled these were not minor inconsistencies but went to the heart of the narrative’s plausibility. Given the setting described—with other family members present in a small room—the Court found it highly improbable for the rape to have occurred without awakening them, creating doubt as to its actual commission. Therefore, while the first conviction stands as modified (designating the crime simply as rape under Article 266-A(1)(d)), the appeal for the second count was granted, resulting in acquittal.