G.R. No. 201622 OCTOBER 4, 2017
ANGELITO L. CRISTOBAL, Petitioner, vs. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., AND LUCIO TAN, Respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Angelito L. Cristobal, a PAL pilot, filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and retirement benefits after PAL deemed him to have lost his employment status following his application for leave to work for another airline. The Labor Arbiter ruled in his favor, awarding retirement pay computed under Article 287 of the Labor Code, plus moral and exemplary damages. The National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) affirmed but reduced the damages. Both parties filed motions for reconsideration.
In its subsequent Resolution, the NLRC substantially reversed its own affirmance. It deleted the award of moral and exemplary damages entirely and, critically, reversed the legal basis for the retirement pay. It held that Article 287 of the Labor Code was inapplicable and that Cristobal was entitled only to the amount under the 1967 PAL-ALPAP Retirement Plan. Cristobal filed a motion for reconsideration of this new NLRC Resolution. PAL opposed, arguing it was a prohibited second motion for reconsideration. The NLRC denied Cristobal’s motion. He then filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which dismissed it for being filed out of time, implicitly rejecting his argument that a fresh 60-day period to file certiorari should run from the denial of his motion questioning the reversal.

ISSUE

Whether the motion for reconsideration filed by Cristobal from the NLRC Resolution of May 31, 2011—which substantially reversed the NLRC’s prior affirmance of the Labor Arbiter’s decision—constitutes a prohibited second motion for reconsideration.

RULING

No. The Supreme Court ruled that Cristobal’s motion was not a prohibited second motion for reconsideration. The legal logic is anchored on the nature of the NLRC’s May 31, 2011 Resolution. This Resolution was not a mere reiteration or slight modification of the earlier NLRC Decision; it was a substantive reversal that introduced entirely new rulings on key matters, particularly the basis for computing retirement benefits and the complete deletion of damages. When a tribunal issues a resolution that effectively sets aside its previous decision and rules upon the merits of the motions for reconsideration in a substantially different manner, that resolution is treated as a new decision.
Consequently, a party adversely affected by this new decision is entitled to seek its reconsideration. This first motion for reconsideration of the new ruling does not violate the rule against a second motion for reconsideration, as it is, in substance, the first opportunity to challenge that specific adverse ruling. The Court emphasized that procedural rules should not be applied rigidly to defeat substantial justice. Since Cristobal’s motion was the first to assail the new and unfavorable dispositions in the reversal resolution, the 60-day period to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 should be reckoned from his receipt of the order denying that motion. Therefore, the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing his petition as tardy. The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court’s resolutions and ordered the reinstatement of Cristobal’s petition for further proceedings.