G.R. No. 201147 , September 21, 2022
People of the Philippines, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. Freddie Sernadilla, Accused-Appellant.

FACTS

Accused-appellant Freddie Sernadilla, a pastor, was charged with three counts of Rape against AAA, a minor and member of his church. The Informations for all three cases uniformly alleged that the accused “willfully, unlawfully and feloniously had carnal knowledge with [AAA]… against her will and consent.” The Regional Trial Court convicted Sernadilla of one count of Rape under the Revised Penal Code for the first charge, finding force and intimidation were proven. For the second and third charges, however, the trial court found that AAA submitted due to Sernadilla’s material “influence” and support, and thus convicted him of two counts of Child Abuse under Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 7610 . The Court of Appeals affirmed this decision.

ISSUE

Whether the accused-appellant can be validly convicted under Section 5(b) of R.A. 7610 for charges where the Informations specifically alleged the elements of Rape under the Revised Penal Code, namely, carnal knowledge “against her will and consent.”

RULING

No. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction for Rape in the first charge but acquitted Sernadilla for the second and third charges. The ponencia, with which Justice Caguioa concurred, held that convicting the accused under R.A. 7610 for the latter charges would violate his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. The crimes of Rape under the Revised Penal Code and sexual abuse under Section 5(b) of R.A. 7610 are distinct and have different elements. Rape requires carnal knowledge through force, threat, intimidation, or other specific circumstances. In contrast, Section 5(b) of R.A. 7610 penalizes sexual intercourse with a child who is deemed exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse due to “coercion or influence.” The Informations in this case solely alleged the element of “against her will and consent,” which is constitutive of Rape, not the “coercion or influence” element under R.A. 7610. Since the prosecution’s evidence for the second and third charges only established “influence” and not force or intimidation, the facts proved did not constitute the crime alleged in the Informations. The ruling clarifies the distinction between the two laws and corrects the confusion stemming from the Court’s earlier decision in People v. Tulagan, upholding the fundamental principle that an accused cannot be convicted of an offense whose elements were not alleged in the information.