GR 199780; (September, 2014) (Digest)
G.R. No. 199780 September 24, 2014
Government Service Insurance System vs. Jose M. Capacite
FACTS
Elma Capacite, an employee of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) from 1982 to 2009, died on July 16, 2009, due to “Respiratory Failure secondary to Metastatic Cancer to the lungs; Bowel cancer with Hepatic and Intraperitoneal Seeding and Ovarian cancer.” Her surviving spouse, Jose M. Capacite, filed a claim for Employees’ Compensation Commission (ECC) death benefits with the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), alleging that Elma’s stressful working conditions caused the cancer. The GSIS denied the claim for lack of direct evidence proving a causal connection between the illness and her work. The ECC affirmed the denial, ruling that colorectal cancer is not listed as an occupational disease under the Amended Rules, and while lung cancer is listed, it is only compensable for vinyl chloride or plastic workers, which Elma was not. The Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the ECC, ruling that Elma had “adenocarcinoma of the lungs” or lung cancer, a listed respiratory disease, and that her heirs were entitled to benefits. The CA further held that direct proof of connection was not required; it was enough that her employment as a bookkeeper, exposed to dusty records, contributed to the disease’s development. The GSIS filed the present petition.
ISSUE
Whether the respondent, Jose M. Capacite, is entitled to ECC death benefits arising from the death of his spouse, Elma Capacite.
RULING
No. The Supreme Court granted the GSIS’s petition, reversed the CA decision, and reinstated the ECC decision denying the claim. The Court held that for a sickness to be compensable under P.D. No. 626, the claimant must show either: (1) that it is a result of an occupational disease listed under Annex “A” of the Amended Rules with the conditions satisfied; or (2) if not listed, that the risk of contracting the disease was increased by the working conditions. Elma’s lung cancer, while listed, is only compensable for vinyl chloride or plastic workers, which she was not. Therefore, it was not an occupational disease under the rules. Furthermore, the respondent failed to provide substantial evidence that Elma’s working conditions increased the risk of contracting the disease. The Court distinguished this case from GSIS v. Vicencio, where specific proof of exposure to voluminous dusty records in a dilapidated workplace was presented. Here, mere allegations of a demanding job, overtime work, and exposure to cold room temperature were insufficient. The party alleging an affirmative fact has the burden of proving it with substantial evidence, which was not met. Consequently, the claim for compensation benefits was denied.
