G.R. No. L-19860 December 23, 1964
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JOAQUIN QUIMSING, ET AL., defendants-appellants.

FACTS

The defendants were charged with illegal cockfighting before the municipal court of Iloilo City. The proceedings were initially suspended pending a Supreme Court ruling on the validity of city ordinances allowing cockfighting on Thursdays. After the Supreme Court declared the ordinances invalid, the case proceeded. On September 27, 1961, the municipal court ordered a “provisional dismissal” because the prosecution was not ready for trial at 8:30 AM. The prosecution moved for reconsideration, stating readiness by 9:30 AM. The court reconsidered its order over the defense’s objection on the ground of double jeopardy. The trial was later postponed by agreement. On March 8, 1962, the court again dismissed the case motu proprio because the prosecution was not ready. The fiscal moved for reconsideration. After denial and argument, the court asked the accused if they consented to a provisional dismissal; their counsel answered, “I think they agree.” The court then announced the case as “provisionally dismissed with the consent of the accused.” The following day, the fiscal refiled the same charges. The accused moved to quash on the ground of double jeopardy. The municipal court granted the motion as to seven accused. The fiscal appealed to the Court of First Instance, which sustained the municipal court. The People appealed to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE

Whether the dismissals of the original criminal case constituted double jeopardy, barring the refiling of the charges against the accused.

RULING

No. The Supreme Court set aside the orders sustaining the motion to quash and ordered the case remanded for further proceedings. The Court held that the accused had waived their defense of double jeopardy. After the first dismissal on September 27, 1961, the accused, instead of pursuing the defense, agreed to a postponement and later appeared ready for trial, thereby abandoning the defense. After the second dismissal on March 8, 1962, the accused again agreed to a provisional dismissal through counsel. Thus, they were estopped from pleading double jeopardy upon the refiling of the case, as the refiling was done on the strength of their express assent to the provisional dismissal. Furthermore, the prosecution’s appeal did not place the accused in new jeopardy, as the record did not show that the motion to quash was filed after a plea by the accused; before a plea, jeopardy does not attach. The Court also rejected the argument that the prosecution could not appeal from the municipal court’s order, holding that the rules on appeal by the accused do not preclude the prosecution from appealing provided the accused is not placed in double jeopardy. The Court declined to address the accused’s claim of lack of mens rea, deeming it premature and a matter for the trial on the merits.