G.R. No. 197743 , October 18, 2022
Heirs of Jose Mariano and Helen S. Mariano, et al. vs. City of Naga

FACTS

The case involves a five-hectare parcel of land in Naga City owned by the Mariano family. The City Government has occupied and used the property since 1954, constructing its city hall and housing various government agencies thereon, based on a Deed of Donation executed with the original owners. In 2004, the heirs filed an unlawful detainer case. The Municipal Trial Court dismissed it, but the Regional Trial Court ordered the City to vacate and pay compensation. The Court of Appeals reversed this, but the Supreme Court’s First Division, in a 2018 Decision, reinstated the Regional Trial Court’s order. The First Division found the Deed of Donation void for defects and lack of registration, declared the heirs as having the better right of possession, and ordered the City to vacate and surrender the property.
The City of Naga filed a second Motion for Reconsideration, a generally prohibited pleading, arguing that its occupation constituted a taking for public use. The City contended that the First Division erred in treating the case as a simple ejectment and in ordering vacation and payment of back rentals, instead of recognizing the occupation as a de facto exercise of eminent domain warranting an award of just compensation to the owners.

ISSUE

The core issue in Justice Leonen’s Separate Opinion is whether the Supreme Court En Banc should entertain the City’s second Motion for Reconsideration and, substantively, whether the City’s occupation of the property constitutes a compensable taking under the power of eminent domain, thereby precluding a simple order to vacate.

RULING

Justice Leonen concurred in granting the Petition, agreeing that the second Motion for Reconsideration should be entertained. He cited exceptions to the rule against second motions, such as when the assailed decision is legally erroneous and patently unjust. He analogized the situation to Cristobal v. Philippine Airlines, where a motion seeking reconsideration of a substantial reversal was not considered a prohibited second motion. Here, the First Division’s decision reversed prior rulings on the remedies available when the State takes property.
On the merits, Justice Leonen strongly disagreed with the First Division’s failure to apply eminent domain principles. He argued that the City’s occupation, though initiated under a void deed, unmistakably constituted a taking as defined in Republic v. Vda. de Castellvi: the City entered the property for a prolonged period under color of authority, devoted it to public use, and deprived the owners of all beneficial enjoyment. Therefore, the proper remedy was not ejectment and back rentals but an award of just compensation for the taking. He referenced Secretary of DPWH v. Spouses Tecson, which held that when the government takes property without formal expropriation proceedings, the owner’s recourse is to demand payment of just compensation, not to recover possession. Ordering the City to vacate a site housing essential government offices would cause grave public injury. Thus, the case should be remanded for the determination of just compensation, with legal interest accruing from the time of taking until full payment to properly indemnify the landowners.