GR 196359 Perlas Bernabe (Digest)
G.R. No. 196359 , May 11, 2021
ROSANNA L. TAN-ANDAL, PETITIONER, VS. MARIO VICTOR M. ANDAL, RESPONDENT.
FACTS
The case involves a petition to declare the marriage between Rosanna L. Tan-Andal and Mario Victor M. Andal null and void on the ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. The Supreme Court, in its decision, revisited the existing legal framework for applying Article 36 and modified the guidelines established in the landmark case of Republic v. Molina. Justice Perlas-Bernabe, in a Separate Concurring Opinion, concurred with granting the petition and elaborated on the legal nuances of psychological incapacity. The opinion traces the origin of Article 36 to Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, specifically its provision on incapacity due to psychological causes. It discusses that the Family Code Revision Committee integrated this canonical concept into civil law as an “acceptable alternative to divorce” and a mechanism to address church annulments not recognized by civil law, without violating the principle of separation of Church and State. The opinion critiques the Molina guidelines for inaccurately characterizing psychological incapacity as a mental illness or serious personality disorder and for imposing requirementsβsuch as being “medically or clinically identified,” “sufficiently proven by experts,” and “medically or clinically permanent or incurable”βthat go beyond the framers’ intent.
ISSUE
Whether the guidelines in Republic v. Molina for declaring a marriage null and void on the ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code should be modified, and whether the marriage between the parties should be declared null and void.
RULING
Justice Perlas-Bernabe concurred that the petition should be granted and the marriage declared null and void. The ponencia aptly modified the Molina guidelines. The concurring opinion explains that psychological incapacity under Article 36 is not an original civil law concept but was lifted from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law. The integration of this canonical concept does not violate the separation of Church and State, as Article 36 serves a legitimate secular purpose to defend against marriages ill-equipped to promote family life and does not force non-Catholics to avail of the ground. The Molina guidelines inaccurately characterized psychological incapacity as a mental illness or serious personality disorder and imposed additional requirements not intended by the framers of the Family Code. The legal understanding of the jurisprudential requisites of gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability should be refined. The opinion concurs with the ponencia’s modification of the Molina guidelines to align with the true intent and application of Article 36.
