G.R. No. L-19457 December 17, 1966
Victorio Mercado, et al., petitioners, vs. The Honorable Judge Felix R. Domingo, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Pampanga, Florencio Gagui, Bernardo Magpayo, Eduardo Bongco, et al., respondents.

FACTS

Petitioners Victorio Mercado, et al., filed a civil case for rescission of contract and recovery of ownership against respondents Florencio Gagui, et al. The respondents filed motions to dismiss, which were denied by the trial court in its order of June 26, 1959. The court declared respondents Eduardo and Natividad Bongco in default on November 5, 1959, and later declared respondents Florencio Gagui, Fermina Gagui, and Bernardo Magpayo in default on January 19, 1960, for failure to file an answer and appear at the hearing. The trial proceeded ex-parte, and a decision was rendered in favor of the petitioners on January 30, 1960. Respondents received a copy of the decision on February 29, 1960. On March 29, 1960, respondents Gagui and Magpayo filed an unsworn motion for reconsideration and new trial, which was denied on April 6, 1960, with notice received on April 13, 1960. On May 7, 1960, all respondents filed a petition for relief under Rule 38, alleging excusable negligence. The trial court granted the petition for relief on September 2, 1960, deducting the period during which the motion for reconsideration was pending from the 60-day filing period for a petition for relief. Petitioners challenged this order via certiorari.

ISSUE

Whether the respondent court committed a grave abuse of discretion in granting the petition for relief, which was filed beyond the 60-day period prescribed by Rule 38.

RULING

Yes. The Supreme Court granted the writ of certiorari, annulled the orders of the trial court, and declared the judgment on the merits final and executory. The Court held that the 60-day period for filing a petition for relief under Rule 38, Section 3 is mandatory and non-extendible. This period is counted from the time the petitioner learns of the judgment, order, or proceeding to be set aside. The filing of a motion for reconsideration does not suspend or toll this 60-day period. The respondents learned of the judgment on February 29, 1960, and filed their petition for relief on May 7, 1960, which was beyond the 60-day limit. The trial court erred in deducting the time the motion for reconsideration was pending. Furthermore, the alleged negligence of counsel’s brother-in-law misplacing the mail was not considered excusable. The proper remedy for the defaulted respondents was to file a petition for relief from the order of default promptly after learning of it, without waiting for the finality of the judgment on the merits.