GR 193846; (April, 2011) (Digest)
G.R. No. 193846 ; April 12, 2011
MARIA LAARNI L. CAYETANO, Petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and DANTE O. TINGA, Respondents.
FACTS
In the automated May 10, 2010 elections, petitioner Maria Laarni L. Cayetano and private respondent Dante O. Tinga were candidates for Mayor of Taguig City. Cayetano was proclaimed the winner with 95,865 votes against Tinga’s 93,445 votes. On May 24, 2010, Tinga filed an Election Protest (EPC No. 2010-44) before the COMELEC, alleging fraud and irregularities and claiming he was the actual winner. Cayetano filed her Answer with Counter-Protest and Counterclaim on June 7, 2010, raising the affirmative defense of insufficiency in form and content of the protest and praying for its dismissal. After a preliminary conference, the COMELEC Second Division issued an Order dated August 23, 2010, finding both the protest and counter-protest sufficient in form and substance, thereby denying Cayetano’s affirmative defense, and issuing directives for cash deposits, retrieval of ballot boxes, and other recount procedures. Cayetano filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the COMELEC denied in its Order dated September 7, 2010. Cayetano then filed this petition for certiorari under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65, assailing these COMELEC Orders.
ISSUE
Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in refusing to dismiss the election protest of private respondent for alleged insufficiency in form and content.
RULING
The Supreme Court DISMISSED the petition. The Court held that it has no power to review, via certiorari, an interlocutory order or even a final resolution of a division of the COMELEC, pursuant to Section 3, Article IX-C of the Constitution and the doctrine established in Repol v. COMELEC. An exception applies only where a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion is apparent on its face. In this case, the assailed Orders were merely interlocutory, as they did not finally dispose of the election protest but merely ruled on the sufficiency of the protest and counter-protest and set the stage for the recount proceedings. The main election protest and counter-protest remained pending before the COMELEC, which afforded petitioner ample opportunity to ventilate her grievances. The Court found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC, as its actions were in accordance with its rules and procedural steps for election contests. The COMELEC was directed to decide the pending cases with dispatch.
