G.R. No. 193459 ; March 8, 2011
MA. MERCEDITAS N. GUTIERREZ, Petitioner, vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE, et al., Respondents. FELICIANO BELMONTE, JR., Respondent-Intervenor.

FACTS

This is a resolution on petitioner Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez’s “Motion for Reconsideration” of the Court’s Decision dated February 15, 2011. The underlying case involves challenges to the impeachment proceedings initiated against her as Ombudsman. In her Motion, Gutierrez argued, among other things, that the Court’s Decision sharply deviated from the doctrine established in Francisco, Jr. v. The House of Representatives. She contended that the one-year bar on impeachment proceedings should be reckoned from the mere filing of an impeachment complaint, not from the completion of the initiation process (filing and referral). She also asserted that referral is not an indispensable part of initiation, especially if a complaint is filed directly by one-third of House members, and that the Court’s ruling left the determination of when a proceeding is initiated to the discretion of the House of Representatives.

ISSUE

Whether the Court’s Decision dated February 15, 2011, which defined the initiation of an impeachment proceeding as comprising both the filing of a complaint and its referral to the proper committee for purposes of the one-year bar rule, should be reconsidered.

RULING

The Court DENIED the Motion for Reconsideration. It held that its February 15, 2011 Decision did not deviate from but rather reaffirmed and illuminated the Francisco doctrine. The Court clarified and emphasized the following points:
1. The initiation of an impeachment proceeding, as established in Francisco, includes the House’s initial action on a complaint, which is its referral to the appropriate committee. Therefore, the one-year bar period is reckoned from this completed act of initiation (filing and referral), not from the filing alone. Petitioner’s own concession that a proceeding is initiated “upon the referral” undermined her position.
2. The separate opinion of Justice Azcuna in Francisco, which referred to “constructive initiation by legal fiction,” was addressing a different issue—specifically, the challenged provisions of the old Impeachment Rules that deemed initiation to occur at later stages (e.g., upon a committee finding of sufficiency). It did not refer to the filing-and-referral process, which is the core of the Francisco ruling on initiation.
3. Petitioner’s argument that referral is not integral to initiation in cases where a complaint is filed by one-third of the House is irrelevant, as the facts of the case do not present such a scenario. The Court noted in a footnote from its main Decision that in such an “abbreviated mode,” filing and the initial House action are merged into a single act.
4. The constitutional one-year bar rule is a limitation on the House’s power to initiate proceedings. The House cannot refer a complaint if a bar is subsisting, as doing so would constitute initiating a second proceeding, which may be challenged for grave abuse of discretion. The Court’s duty includes examining the rationale behind the proscription to prevent abuse, such as harassment of impeachable officers and disruption of congressional functions.
5. The Court did not leave the determination of initiation to the House’s discretion. It merely underscored the House’s constitutional role in the initiation process through the act of referral. The House has no discretion to refuse referral of a valid complaint, but it must ascertain whether a constitutional bar exists before making a referral.
The Court found no substantial or cogent reason to reconsider its Decision, as petitioner’s arguments were either addressed by Francisco or were not applicable to the case at bar.