GR 190545; (November, 2010) (Digest)
G.R. No. 190545 ; November 22, 2010
JERRY M. FRANCISCO, Petitioner, vs. BAHIA SHIPPING SERVICES, INC. and/or CYNTHIA C. MENDOZA, and FRED OLSEN CRUISE LINES, LTD., Respondents.
FACTS
Petitioner Jerry M. Francisco, an ordinary seaman, entered into his fourth consecutive employment contract with respondents on April 5, 2004. His Pre-Employment Medical Examination (PEME) noted his prior January 2004 medical repatriation for a “Generalized Tonic-Clonic Type Seizure Disorder,” but he was declared fit to work. He boarded the vessel on April 24, 2004. On May 26, 2004, his seizures recurred, leading to his repatriation on June 3, 2004. The company-designated physician, Dr. Robert Lim, treated him and assessed his seizure disorder as not work-related.
After receiving his sickness benefits, petitioner consulted a private physician, Dr. Efren Vicaldo, in April 2005, who declared him unfit for duty with a 20.15% disability and deemed the illness work-aggravated. Petitioner thus filed a complaint for disability benefits. The Labor Arbiter ruled in his favor, but the NLRC reversed, finding the illness pre-existing. The Court of Appeals affirmed the NLRC, holding the illness not compensable under the 2000 POEA Contract.
ISSUE
Whether petitioner is entitled to total and permanent disability benefits for his seizure disorder.
RULING
No. The Supreme Court denied the petition, ruling the illness was not compensable. First, the seizure disorder was a pre-existing condition, having caused petitioner’s repatriation under a prior contract with the same employer. Each contract is separate; an illness from a prior contract is deemed pre-existing for subsequent employment. The PEME’s “fit to work” declaration is not a conclusive assessment of a seafarer’s health, as the examination is not exploratory.
Second, even assuming the illness was not pre-existing, petitioner failed to prove it was work-related under the 2000 POEA Contract. For a non-listed illness like a seizure disorder, a disputable presumption of work-relatedness applies. However, this presumption was sufficiently rebutted by the categorical, months-long assessment of the company-designated physician that the illness was not work-related. Petitioner presented no substantial evidence linking his work conditions to the illness. His private doctor’s contrary opinion, based on a single consultation, did not outweigh the company doctor’s findings, especially as petitioner failed to avail of the contractual procedure to seek a binding third-doctor opinion. While the law is construed liberally in favor of seafarers, compensation cannot be granted based on surmises absent proof of work-relatedness.
