G.R. No. 189852 . August 17, 2016.
THOMAS BEGNAEN, PETITIONER, VS. SPOUSES LEO CALIGTAN AND ELMA CALIGTAN, RESPONDENTS.

FACTS

Petitioner Thomas Begnaen, a member of the Kankanaey Tribe (an Indigenous Cultural Community), filed a Complaint for “Land Dispute and Enforcement of Rights” against respondent Spouses Leo and Elma Caligtan before the NCIP Regional Hearing Office (RHO). The NCIP-RHO dismissed the complaint for failure to first exhaust remedies under customary laws. Begnaen then filed a Complaint for Forcible Entry with Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Bauko, Mt. Province. He alleged that the respondents, by force and stealth, entered a portion of his 125-square-meter ancestral land and erected a fence and shack. The respondents claimed ownership of the disputed area as part of land purchased in 1959, with boundaries established by custom (a “GIKAD” or old pine tree lumber). The MCTC dismissed the ejectment complaint, holding that the NCIP had primary, original, and exclusive jurisdiction over the ancestral land dispute pursuant to the Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act (IPRA). The Regional Trial Court (RTC) reversed the MCTC, ruling that the IPRA’s jurisdictional provisions did not divest the MCTC of its jurisdiction over forcible entry cases under B.P. Blg. 129. The Court of Appeals (CA) reinstated the MCTC’s dismissal, holding that the passage of the IPRA divested regular courts of jurisdiction when the parties are ICCs/IPs and the property is ancestral land.

ISSUE

Whether the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in upholding the jurisdiction of the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) over the ancestral land dispute, to the exclusion of the regular courts.

RULING

The Supreme Court DENIED the Petition and AFFIRMED the CA Decision. However, it clarified the jurisdictional ruling. The Court reaffirmed its precedent in Lim v. Gamosa, which declared void the NCIP Administrative Rules (particularly NCIP Administrative Circular No. 1-03 and the 2014 Revised Rules) that purported to grant the NCIP “original and exclusive” jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs. The Court held that these administrative rules impermissibly expanded the jurisdiction granted by Section 66 of the IPRA (Republic Act No. 8371). The IPRA itself does not confer original and exclusive jurisdiction upon the NCIP over all such disputes. The NCIP’s jurisdiction under Section 66 of the IPRA is conditioned on the exhaustion of remedies under customary laws and, based on Unduran v. Aberasturi, applies primarily to disputes arising between or among parties belonging to the same ICC/IP. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court upheld the dismissal of the forcible entry case by the MCTC and the CA on a different procedural ground: the petitioner’s failure to comply with the certification requirement under Section 408 of the Local Government Code ( Republic Act No. 7160 ), which mandates that parties must first undergo barangay conciliation before filing a case in court. The petitioner’s false certification in his complaint regarding this requirement was a fatal defect that warranted the dismissal of his case. Thus, while the CA’s reasoning on NCIP jurisdiction was incorrect in light of Lim, its dispositive ruling reinstating the MCTC’s dismissal of the complaint was ultimately affirmed.