G.R. No. 18925 ; September 28, 1922
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee, vs. PEDRO MIRASOL, defendant-appellant.

FACTS

A complaint for abduction without violence (with consent) of a 14-year-old virgin was filed against Pedro Mirasol. After arraignment and plea of not guilty, trial commenced with the testimony of the victim, Matilde Abello. Based on her testimony, the trial judge dismissed the complaint, finding that the abduction was committed against her will, a graver offense. The judge ordered the prosecuting attorney to file a new complaint for abduction against the will. A new complaint for abduction with violence and against the will was filed. Upon arraignment on the new complaint, Mirasol pleaded not guilty and interposed the defense of double jeopardy, arguing he had already been placed in jeopardy under the first complaint. The trial court denied the motion, proceeded with the trial, found him guilty of abduction against the will, and sentenced him. Mirasol appealed, assigning errors on the sufficiency of evidence and the denial of his double jeopardy plea.

ISSUE

1. Whether the evidence proved the defendant guilty of abduction against the will of the offended party.
2. Whether the defendant’s constitutional right against double jeopardy was violated.

RULING

1. Yes, the evidence proved guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court, after examining the evidence, affirmed the trial court’s findings of fact. The evidence established that the accused used intimidation by boasting of his position as a municipal councilor to compel the 14-year-old girl to go with him against her will, and subsequently had carnal knowledge with her through force and intimidation.
2. No, double jeopardy did not attach. The Supreme Court held that the dismissal of the first complaint for abduction with consent, upon motion of the court after hearing the victim’s testimony, was not an acquittal. The dismissal was ordered because the evidence showed a different and graver offense (abduction against the will) was committed. The new complaint was for a distinct offense based on different facts (use of violence and intimidation), not the same offense. Therefore, the defendant was not placed in jeopardy a second time for the same offense. The judgment of conviction was affirmed.