G.R. No. 185938 . September 06, 2017.
ALICIA M.L. COSETENG AND DILIMAN PREPARATORY SCHOOL, PETITIONERS, VS. LETICIA P. PEREZ, RESPONDENT.

FACTS

Respondent Leticia P. Perez was a long-time teacher at Diliman Preparatory School. In 1994, she was investigated for failing to remit student payments for magazine subscriptions, resulting in a suspension. Subsequently, she was implicated in a cheating incident during an exam she proctored, leading to a second investigation and another suspension. Upon serving this suspension, she was instructed to report back on June 13, 1995, for a new assignment as a “floating teacher,” with extended hours and potential non-teaching duties, though with the same salary. Instead of reporting, Perez faxed a resignation letter on June 14, 1995, citing her need to accompany her father to the United States. She received her retirement annuity contributions and filed a complaint for constructive dismissal only in June 1998.

ISSUE

The core issue is whether Perez was constructively dismissed, rendering her resignation involuntary, or if her resignation was voluntary, thereby barring her claim for separation benefits.

RULING

The Supreme Court ruled that Perez was NOT constructively dismissed and that her resignation was voluntary. Constructive dismissal exists when an act of clear discrimination, insensibility, or disdain by the employer renders continued employment intolerable, forcing the employee to resign. The Court found no such intolerable conditions here. The reassignment to a floating teacher status was a legitimate management prerogative, justified because her suspension period caused her to miss the start of the school year for regular class assignment. The new duties and schedule, while different, did not constitute a demotion in rank or a diminution in pay, benefits, or status. The employer acted in good faith following disciplinary proceedings. Perez’s resignation letter, which provided a personal reason for leaving and made no mention of any protest or duress, was a voluntary act. Her subsequent claim, filed three years later, that the stated reason was a pretext was deemed an afterthought insufficient to prove constructive dismissal. Consequently, her claim for separation pay was denied. The Court also upheld the denial of the petitioners’ claim for damages, as they failed to substantiate their counterclaim with clear evidence of bad faith on Perez’s part.