GR 185140; (June, 2009) (Digest)
G.R. No. 185140 ; June 30, 2009
JERRY B. AGUILAR, Petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ROMULO R. INSOY, Respondents.
FACTS
Petitioner Jerry B. Aguilar was proclaimed the winner by one vote in the October 2007 barangay elections for Punong Barangay. Private respondent Romulo R. Insoy filed an election protest. The Municipal Trial Court (MTC) ruled in favor of Insoy, nullifying Aguilar’s proclamation. Aguilar appealed to the COMELEC, paying an appeal fee of ₱1,000.00 as required by A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC (Rules of Procedure in Election Contests Before the Courts Involving Elective Municipal and Barangay Officials).
The COMELEC First Division dismissed Aguilar’s appeal for failure to pay the ₱3,000.00 appeal fee prescribed under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. Aguilar filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing the applicable fee was only ₱1,000.00 under the new Supreme Court rules. The COMELEC First Division denied this motion for failure to pay the complete motion fee. Aguilar filed a second motion for reconsideration, contending the first denial was void as motions for reconsideration of Division rulings must be resolved by the COMELEC en banc. The First Division denied this second motion as a prohibited pleading and declared its initial dismissal order final.
ISSUE
Whether the COMELEC First Division committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed orders denying Aguilar’s motion for reconsideration.
RULING
Yes. The Supreme Court granted the petition, annulling the COMELEC First Division’s orders. The legal logic is anchored on a clear constitutional and procedural violation. Article IX-C, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution mandates that motions for reconsideration of decisions of a COMELEC Division shall be decided by the Commission en banc. This is mirrored in the COMELEC Rules of Procedure (Rule 19, Sections 5 and 6).
When Aguilar filed his motion for reconsideration of the First Division’s order dismissing his appeal, the Division was constitutionally obligated to certify the case to the Commission en banc for resolution. By resolving the motion itself and subsequently denying a second motion, the First Division arrogated unto itself the exclusive authority of the en banc. This act was not merely an error of judgment but a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, as it disregarded a fundamental constitutional command governing the COMELEC’s internal procedure. Consequently, the orders issued by the Division on the motion for reconsideration were issued without jurisdiction and are absolute nullities. The Supreme Court, exercising its certiorari powers, set aside these void orders.