GR 184948; (July, 2009) (Digest)
G.R. No. 184948 ; July 21, 2009
CONG. GLENN A. CHONG, MR. CHARLES CHONG, and MR. ROMEO ARRIBE, Petitioners, vs. HON. PHILIP L. DELA CRUZ, HON. ROMEO D.C. GALVEZ, HON. RAMON CHITO R. MENDOZA, State Prosecutors, and HON. RAUL M. GONZALES, Secretary of Justice, Respondents.
FACTS
Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 directly with the Supreme Court, assailing Joint Orders dated September 29, 2008, issued by the Department of Justice (DOJ). The DOJ orders denied their motions for postponement and motion to remand in several preliminary investigation cases. The Supreme Court, in a Resolution dated November 17, 2008, dismissed the petition for lack of merit and for procedural deficiencies.
The petitioners subsequently filed a Motion for Reconsideration. The Supreme Court noted that the original petition was procedurally infirm for failing to state the material dates of receipt of the assailed orders, as required by the Rules of Court. Furthermore, the petition lacked legible duplicate original or certified true copies of the challenged orders.
ISSUE
Whether the Supreme Court correctly denied the Motion for Reconsideration and sustained the dismissal of the petition for certiorari due to procedural defects and for violating the rule on hierarchy of courts.
RULING
The Supreme Court denied the Motion for Reconsideration, finding no cogent reason to reverse its earlier dismissal. The Court emphasized that a petition for certiorari is an extraordinary remedy, and parties must strictly comply with procedural rules. The petitioners’ failure to state material dates and to submit proper copies were not mere technicalities but substantive violations that warranted dismissal.
Crucially, the Court ruled that the petitioners disregarded the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. While the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, and Regional Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, direct recourse to the Supreme Court is not permissible absent special and compelling reasons. The policy is to prevent inordinate demands on the Court’s time and to keep its docket manageable. The petitioners should have first filed their petition with the Court of Appeals, which has jurisdiction to review DOJ resolutions for grave abuse of discretion. The issues raised—involving the denial of motions for postponement and remand—were within the normal precincts of an appeal and did not present any exceptional circumstance justifying a direct invocation of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction. Therefore, the dismissal of the petition was proper.