G.R. No. 184537 ; April 23, 2010
QUINTIN B. SALUDAGA and SPO2 FIEL E. GENIO, Petitioners, vs. The HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, 4th DIVISION and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

FACTS

Petitioners Quintin B. Saludaga and SPO2 Fiel E. Genio were charged with violating Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 (Anti-Graft Law) for awarding a “pakyaw” contract for day care centers without public bidding in 1997. An initial Information alleged they caused “undue injury” to the government. The Sandiganbayan Third Division granted their Motion to Quash this Information in 2002, dismissing the case for failure to allege the specific amount of actual damage, an essential element of the “undue injury” mode.
Subsequently, the Office of the Special Prosecutor re-filed the case in 2007 before the Sandiganbayan Fourth Division under a new docket number. The new Information charged the same offense but under a different mode: giving “unwarranted benefit, advantage, or preference” to a private contractor. Petitioners filed a Motion for Preliminary Investigation, arguing the re-filed Information constituted either a substitution of the original charge or a substantial amendment, necessitating a new preliminary investigation.

ISSUE

Whether the re-filing of the Information, which charged a different mode of violating the same statutory provision, required the conduct of a new preliminary investigation.

RULING

The Supreme Court denied the petition and upheld the Sandiganbayan’s ruling. The legal logic is that a preliminary investigation is required only once for each offense. The re-filed Information did not charge a new or different offense; it merely alleged a different mode of committing the same offense under Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 . The provision defines one crime that may be committed in various ways: through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence, resulting in either undue injury or unwarranted benefit. A shift from alleging “undue injury” to “unwarranted benefit” is not a change in the offense but a change in the modality of its commission. The factual nucleus of the charge—the awarding of the contract without bidding—remained identical. Since the accused were already afforded their right to a preliminary investigation on the core facts, a new one was not mandated. The Court emphasized that the right is to an investigation of the offense, not to a specific theory of its commission, and the prosecution may refine the charge based on the same evidence without violating this right.