GR 183027; (July, 2010) (Digest)
G.R. No. 183027 ; July 26, 2010
SPOUSES EDMUNDO and LOURDES SARROSA, Petitioners, vs. WILLY O. DIZON, Respondent.
FACTS
Petitioners Spouses Sarrosa obtained a loan from respondent Willy Dizon, secured by a real estate mortgage over their property. Upon default, respondent extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage. The property was sold to respondent as the highest bidder. Petitioners failed to redeem the property within the statutory period, leading respondent to consolidate ownership and obtain a new title. Respondent then filed an ex-parte petition for a writ of possession in the Regional Trial Court (RTC).
Petitioners had previously filed a separate civil case against respondent for breach of contract and damages, seeking to enjoin the foreclosure. They later moved to consolidate this civil case with the ex-parte petition for a writ of possession. The RTC denied the motion for consolidation as procedurally improper and subsequently granted the writ of possession. Petitioners elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari.
ISSUE
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition and upholding the RTC’s orders denying consolidation and issuing the writ of possession.
RULING
The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the Court of Appeals. The dismissal by the CA was proper due to petitioners’ failure to state material dates in their petition, a ground for dismissal under procedural rules. On substantive grounds, the RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion. First, consolidation of cases is discretionary with the court. The ex-parte petition for a writ of possession (LRC Case No. 05-0047) and the civil case for breach of contract (Civil Case No. 02-0335) involve different causes of action and purposes; the former is a summary proceeding, while the latter is an ordinary action. Denying consolidation was within the RTC’s sound discretion.
Second, the issuance of the writ of possession was ministerial. Upon expiration of the redemption period and consolidation of title in the purchaser’s name, the right to possession becomes absolute. The court’s duty to issue the writ is ministerial and does not depend on the merits of any separate action questioning the foreclosure’s validity. Any pending action for annulment of mortgage or foreclosure does not divest the RTC of its authority to grant the writ. The trial court, therefore, correctly performed its ministerial duty in issuing the writ of possession in favor of respondent.