G.R. No. 182356 ; December 4, 2013
Dra. Leila A. Dela Llano, Petitioner, vs. Rebecca Biong, doing business under the name and style of Pongkay Trading, Respondent.

FACTS

On March 30, 2000, a dump truck owned by respondent Rebecca Biong and driven by her employee, Joel Primero, rammed the rear of a car where petitioner Dra. Leila Dela Llana was a passenger. The traffic report cited Primero’s reckless imprudence. Initially, Dela Llana suffered only minor wounds from glass splinters. However, over a month later, she developed severe neck and shoulder pain, eventually diagnosed as a whiplash injury requiring cervical spine surgery. The surgery incapacitated her from her medical practice.
Dela Llana sued Biong for damages. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) ruled in her favor, finding Primero negligent and holding Biong vicariously liable as employer. The Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the decision. The CA found that Dela Llana failed to prove the causal link between the accident and her whiplash injury by preponderance of evidence, noting the one-month gap before symptoms appeared. It also held that Biong successfully rebutted the presumption of negligence in the selection and supervision of her driver.

ISSUE

The core issues were: (1) Whether Dela Llana established by competent evidence that her whiplash injury was proximately caused by the vehicular accident; and (2) Whether Biong exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of her driver to avoid vicarious liability.

RULING

The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the CA decision. On the first issue, the Court emphasized that in civil cases, the plaintiff must prove their claim by preponderance of evidence. Dela Llana’s evidence, primarily her own testimony and a medical certificate, was insufficient. The medical certificate, while stating she suffered a whiplash injury, was considered hearsay as the issuing doctor was not presented for cross-examination. Crucially, Dela Llana failed to present expert medical testimony to clearly establish that the accident was the proximate cause of the specific injury that manifested weeks later. The temporal gap raised reasonable doubt not adequately addressed by her evidence.
On the second issue, the Court found that Biong successfully proved she observed the required diligence. She presented evidence that Primero submitted necessary clearances and passed a driving test before employment, and that the vehicle was checked and in good condition prior to the accident. This evidence overturned the presumption of negligence in selection and supervision. Consequently, Biong could not be held vicariously liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. The petition failed due to insufficiency of evidence on both critical points.