G.R. No. 181435 October 2, 2017
Republic of the Philippines, Petitioner vs. Rosario L. Nicolas, Respondent

FACTS

Respondent Rosario L. Nicolas filed a petition for registration of title over a 118,448-square-meter parcel of land in Rodriguez, Rizal. She claimed open, continuous, adverse, and notorious possession in the concept of an owner since 1940, later amended to 1964. The Republic opposed, arguing she failed to prove possession since June 12, 1945, and that the land remained part of the inalienable public domain. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) granted the petition, finding she had acquired ownership through possession. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed, holding that even if possession began only in 1964, she qualified under Section 14(2) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 due to over 30 years of possession, and that the land was private based on a private survey and certifications.

ISSUE

Whether the CA erred in affirming the grant of respondent’s application for original registration of title.

RULING

The Supreme Court GRANTED the petition and REVERSED the CA Decision. The Court held that for original registration under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529, an applicant must prove: (1) the land is alienable and disposable agricultural land of the public domain; and (2) possession in the concept of an owner, open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious since June 12, 1945, or earlier. The applicant bears the burden of proving these requisites by incontrovertible evidence. Here, respondent failed on both counts. First, the certifications from the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) were insufficient to prove the land’s alienable and disposable status. The CENRO reports explicitly stated they could not verify this classification, with one report leaving the relevant entry blank. A CENRO certification, without a corresponding official proclamation or classification map from the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Secretary, does not constitute conclusive evidence. Second, respondent’s evidence of possession was inadequate. Her claim of possession since 1940 was uncorroborated and inconsistent. Tax declarations and receipts only dated back to 1969, failing to establish possession since 1945. The CA’s alternative reliance on Section 14(2) was erroneous, as that provision applies only to private lands acquired by prescription. Land of the public domain cannot be acquired by prescription; it must first be classified as alienable and disposable. Since respondent failed to overcome the presumption that the land remains part of the inalienable public domain, her application must be denied.