GR 180587; (March, 2009) (Digest)
G.R. No. 180587 March 20, 2009
SIMEON CABANG, VIRGINIA CABANG and VENANCIO CABANG ALIAS “DONDON”, Petitioners, vs. MR. & MRS. GUILLERMO BASAY, Respondents.
FACTS
The registered owner of Lot No. 7777 was Felix Odong, whose heirs sold it to respondents Guillermo Basay and spouse in 1987. Respondents never occupied the lot. Petitioners, the Cabang family, had been in continuous, open, peaceful, and adverse possession of the same parcel of land since 1956, believing they were occupying the adjacent Lot No. 7778. A 1992 relocation survey discovered petitioners were actually occupying Lot No. 7777. Respondents filed a Complaint for Recovery of Property. The trial court dismissed the case, holding respondents’ right to recover was barred by laches. The Court of Appeals reversed, declaring respondents entitled to possession subject to petitioners’ rights under Articles 448, 546, 547, and 548 of the Civil Code (governing builders in good faith), and remanded the case for further proceedings. This decision became final and executory after the Supreme Court denied petitioners’ petition. On remand, a Commissioner determined the appraised value of petitioners’ improvements on the lot. A survey also revealed petitioners’ structures occupied portions of both Lots 7777 and 7778. Respondents offered to pay for the improvements, but petitioners refused. Respondents filed a Motion for Execution. The trial court denied the motion, citing difficulty because the houses might constitute a family home. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s order, prompting petitioners to elevate the case to the Supreme Court, insisting the property is a family home not subject to execution.
ISSUE
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court’s order denying execution on the ground that petitioners’ family home was still subsisting.
RULING
The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the Court of Appeals. The purpose of the remand was to enforce the final and executory judgment which declared respondents entitled to possession, subject to petitioners’ rights as builders in good faith under Articles 448, 546, 547, and 548 of the Civil Code. A final and executory judgment may no longer be modified. Once a judgment becomes final, execution issues as a matter of right, and it is the court’s ministerial duty to issue the writ. A writ of execution must conform strictly to the judgment and cannot vary its terms. The final judgment did not declare the property a family home; it only recognized petitioners’ rights as builders in good faith. Raising the new issue of family home at the execution stage is an attempt to vary the final judgment and violates respondents’ right to due process, as points of law, theories, and issues not brought to the attention of the lower court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. Furthermore, for a family home to be exempt from execution, it must be constituted as such in accordance with the Family Code, and petitioners failed to prove this requisite constitutive fact. The trial court’s finding that the property was a family home was a conclusion without citation of specific evidence, and the Court of Appeals correctly reversed it.
