G.R. No. 179978 ; August 31, 2011
DCD CONSTRUCTION, INC., Petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

FACTS

On January 19, 2001, petitioner DCD Construction, Inc., through its President Danilo D. Dira, Jr., filed an application for registration of a 4,493-square-meter parcel of land designated as Cadastral Lot No. 5331-part, CAD 681-D, in Taytay, Danao City. Petitioner claimed acquisition by purchase and that it and its predecessors-in-interest had been in continuous, open, adverse, public, uninterrupted, exclusive, and notorious possession for over thirty years. The lot was later subdivided, with Lot 21225-A (3,781 sq. m.) being the portion applied for registration.
At the trial, Andrea Batucan Enriquez testified that her parents, Vivencio and Paulina Batucan, originally owned the land, which Vivencio bought after World War II. Upon their deaths, she and her siblings inherited the property and sold it to Danilo C. Dira, Sr. (petitioner’s father) on December 22, 1993. Danilo D. Dira, Jr. testified that the property was later inherited by him and his siblings from his father and was subsequently sold to petitioner on June 26, 2000. Tax declarations and payments were presented, with the earliest tax declaration submitted being from 1988.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) granted the application for registration on August 22, 2002. The Republic appealed. The Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the RTC decision on June 25, 2007, finding that petitioner failed to prove the land was alienable and disposable and failed to establish the requisite possession since June 12, 1945. The CA noted that the only evidence of alienability was a notation on the survey plan and that possession was only traced to 1946, with the earliest tax declaration from 1988. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied.

ISSUE

1. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that petitioner failed to prove the subject land is alienable and disposable.
2. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that petitioner failed to prove open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the land since June 12, 1945.

RULING

The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision.
1. On Alienable and Disposable Status: The Court held that petitioner failed to present incontrovertible evidence that the land is alienable and disposable. The notation on the survey plan stating, “CONFORMED PER LC MAP NOTATION LC Map No. 1321, Project No. 26-A certified on June 07, 1938, verified to be within Alienable & Disposable Area,” and signed by Cynthia L. Ibañez, Chief, Map Projection Section, is insufficient. Citing Republic v. Court of Appeals, the Court ruled that such a notation is not the official certification required by law. The certification must come from the proper government agency, specifically the DENR Secretary, or a duly authorized representative, attesting that the land is alienable and disposable. The testimony of a DENR-LMS official regarding the plan’s approval did not constitute the necessary certification. Therefore, petitioner did not overcome the presumption that the land remains part of the inalienable public domain.
2. On Possession Since June 12, 1945: The Court held that petitioner failed to prove the required possession and occupation since June 12, 1945. The testimony of Andrea Batucan Enriquez indicated that her father bought the land after World War II, or around 1946, which is after the critical date. No documentary evidence, such as tax declarations or deeds, substantiated possession prior to 1945. The earliest tax declaration presented was from 1988. Possession must be characterized as open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or from time immemorial. Petitioner’s evidence only showed possession from 1946 onward, which is insufficient for judicial confirmation of title under the Public Land Act or Property Registration Decree.
The Court found no reversible error in the CA’s decision and emphasized that applications for confirmation of imperfect title must strictly comply with the requirements of law, with the burden of proof resting on the applicant.